

Another Reformation: Christian Postliberalism and the Jews (Brazos Press, 20110)

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Chapter 4: Arguing for Christ:

Stanley Hauerwas's Theopractic Reasoning

Here this word, you cows of Bashan
On the hill of Samaria –
Who defraud the poor,
Who rob the needy.... (Amos 4:1)

Stanley Hauerwas argues a lot and in a lot of places. Many of us argue, but very few argue this way. Most of us tend to argue in places of relative comfort, where we think we master the local rules of reasoning, but Hauerwas seems to fight on other people's turf, where he shares few of the local rules and where his arguments are bound to be unpopular. Most of us tend to argue either philosophically, on the basis of what we imagine to be widely shared paradigms of reason, or else territorially, on the basis of assumptions we share with some community. Hauerwas seems to argue both ways at once: addressing the reasonings of some particular group and arguing with them in ways that address both their assumptions and more widely shared norms. Put this way, Hauerwas seem to argue like a philosopher in the tradition of pragmatism: reasoning broadly but from out of the context of local concerns. If that is what he was doing, however, I don't think folks would get angry at him the way they do: they would more likely either ignore or thank him. And, of course, he wouldn't be talking about Jesus Christ all the time. I think the prophet Amos offers a closer analogy to Hauerwas's style of argument. But, before entering into this comparison in detail, let me preview the overall agenda of this chapter.

This chapter offers and tests a model of Hauerwas's manner of argumentation, which I classify as a type of "theopractic reasoning." This means a reasoning that is always theological and always attentive to practice. Reading Hauerwas in relation to antecedents in Christian salvation history, I characterize his reasoning as prophetic, pragmatic, retroductive, and Pauline.¹ Toward the end of the chapter, I re-evaluate these characterizations in light of the previous chapters' models of postliberalism. I conclude that, while he shows different emphases, Hauerwas shares in Lindbeck and Jenson's overall practice of postliberal Christian theology and that his reasoning confirms our thesis that postliberalism entails non-supersessionism.

A Prophetic Prototype?

Returning, then, to Amos. Consider the general impression of these different verses of criticism:

(1) And he said, The LORD will roar from Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem; and the habitations of the shepherds shall mourn, and the top of Carmel shall wither...(Amos 1:2)

The critical energy may not be so far from Hauerwas' style of criticism. And the standard of judgment belongs to God.

(2) Thus said the LORD; For three transgressions of Gaza, and for four, I will not turn away [the punishment] thereof; because they carried away captive the whole captivity, to deliver [them] up to Edom: (1:6)

The criticism is for specific acts against other people: the ground of judgment may be divine, but the object of judgment is some local human action.

(3) Thus said the LORD; For three transgressions of Edom, and for four, I will not turn away [the punishment] thereof; because he did pursue his brother with the sword, and did cast off all pity, and his anger did tear perpetually, and he kept his wrath for ever. (1:11-12)

The criticism has a repetitious quality: what differs in each case is the particular crime. The punishment fits the crime in some way, which suggests that the genre of divine "anger" may be correlative to the genre of human crime. This point is illustrated more clearly when we compare Amos' prophesy with Hosea's: in Amos' voice the God of Israel speaks anger and fire; in Hosea's, the same God often speaks compassion, "I have had a change of heart, All My tenderness is stirred" (Hosea 11:8). The simplest explanation is that, in one case, Israel has acted with effrontery and the energy of God's anger mirrors the energy of Israel's sin; in the other case, Israel has already suffered for her sins and lies ravaged; God's compassion complements Israel's emptiness.

(4) You alone have I singled out of all the families of the earth: therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities. Can two walk together, except they be agreed? (3: 2-3).

(5) Hear this word, you cows of Bashan... who defraud the poor. (4:1)

The criticism belongs to a specific relationship, which has a specific history: God and this people walked together before and already came to an understanding. that Israel would not act as it now acts. The relationship is therefore characterized by both familiarity and austere criticism, intimacy and irony.

(6) I will restore My people Israel. They shall rebuild ruined cities and inhabit them.... Nevermore to be uprooted from the soil I have given them. (9:14-15).

But the irony ends. The severity of God's judgment remains within this relationship; God thus binds Himself to His renewed promise that Israel shall one day merit His full blessing.

Like the philosophic pragmatist, the prophet Amos receives God's voice for the sake of identifying what John Dewey calls a "problematic situation": examining it, diagnosing the source of the problem, and recommending (or commanding) remedial actions. Like Amos, the pragmatist draws on deep sources of reparative wisdom, relevant to many possible needs, but directs this wisdom to the specific problem at hand. Unlike the philosophic pragmatist, Amos names the ultimate source of wisdom "God" rather than "reason" or common sense, and he serves only as witness to the wisdom rather than as active agent.

Does Hauerwas sound more like Amos or like the philosophic pragmatist? The preceding verses from Amos bring to mind the following features of Hauerwas' argumentation:

Critical energy on behalf of divine judgment: The energy is displayed in part by the sheer volume of written and spoken arguments, but also by Hauerwas' willingness to challenge his interlocutors directly.²

Considering the relation of divine judgment to historically specific human actions: One of Hauerwas's central judgments is against his colleagues' efforts to generalize beyond the specific contexts of their critical inquiries.

Criticisms are offered within relationships of shared history and witness: Hauerwas criticizes his neighbors, not distant strangers. This criticism is thus a mark of some breach in some relationship or in some shared witness; the criticism is a call to both truth (as fidelity to the word) and reconciliation.

Irony, humor, and sometimes sarcasm are marks of some breach in some relationship: Hauerwas criticizes out of three-part relationships that connect him to certain others by way of their over-lapping relations to God. He tends to write without criticism and with less affect when addressing thinkers who tend to be distant from such relations. I read irony, humor, and sarcasm as marks of broken relationships that might, nevertheless, be one day healed. The more distant the day, perhaps the more biting the sarcasm.

Irony and sarcasm are replaced in the end with eschatology: anticipating how lines of relationship, now broken, may touch again in the promised future: I suggested earlier that Hauerwas enters into debates on other people's turf. Now we can refine that suggestion. He debates with others who may share a deeper turf even if they believe their surface differences are all that matters. Hauerwas's strategy may be to engage others long enough in what seem to be their terms that some may be tempted to re-define the debate with respect to some third term not now present that could lie between them. Ultimately, this third is a witness to

Jesus Christ, but it may be approached through preliminary witnesses that speak the languages of Hauerwas's interlocutors.

Prophetic Reasoning, Modern and Postliberal³

Hauerwas appears to reason like the Biblical prophets. Readers may object that Hauerwas often argues in philosophic terms, drawn for example from Aristotle's ethics, while a prophetic model should preclude such philosophic practice. In this section, I evaluate the co-presence of disciplined rationality and prophetic witness in Hauerwas's pragmatism.

"That Ye may know them by their fruit": Reasoning like a Pragmatist

In his Gifford Lectures, *With the Grain of the Universe*, Hauerwas draws on the resources of William James to launch a pragmatic critique of modern natural philosophy: that there is reason for natural philosophy, but that "nature" speaks to us (pace J.S. Mill) only by answering questions we ask of it. This is to know the world around us only through our presuppositions and therefore only as a supposition. In the vocabulary of Scripture, this is to know the world as creation. Hauerwas' argument is that this sort of creation is the most, rather than the least, consistent with the goals of contemporary science. Truth is not a predicate of our immediate intuitions of the world but only of our relationships with the world. Truth is therefore a predicate of our behavior in the world and shaped through the long run of life in the world. Another word for this shaping is the "personality" we achieve in the world or what we call "virtues." Hauerwas' pragmatic theory is that to test the truth of our claims about the world is to test the truth of our virtues.

Hauerwas eventually parts company with James, not because James is too pragmatic, but because he is not pragmatic enough! For James, our knowledge of the world is inseparable from the ways we act in it: from our will to believe. James should therefore argue that our knowledge of the world is "traditioned" and that a Christian tradition for knowing the world has no less validity, *a priori*, than another tradition. Hauerwas argues, however, that James' cultural prejudices led him, for no good philosophical reason, to dismiss specifically Christian presuppositions. James' pragmatism drew on individualistic, Emersonian presuppositions that reduced his capacity to evaluate Christian natural philosophic claims. To right this pragmatic wrong, Hauerwas seeks a philosophic account of our presuppositions about the natural world that is not prejudiced against Christian presuppositions. He has no *a priori* argument to offer about the relative

superiority of Christianity as source of our presuppositions. Christianity is to be proven through its practical consequences, rather than through any evidentiary apologetics. This is precisely why Peirce claimed that his pragmatism was “only a application of the sole principle of logic which was recommended by Jesus, “Ye may know them by their fruits,” and it is very intimately allied with the ideas of the gospel.”⁴ Peirce’s pragmatism displayed both the logic of Jesus’ scripture and Christianity’s stake in the logic of scientific inquiry.

In a recent essay, Hauerwas acknowledges the important influence of Victor Preller on the argument of *With the Grain of the Universe*, in particular his affirmative readings of Aquinas and of Wittgenstein.⁵ Preller (along, more recently, with David Burrell) introduces the best reading of Aquinas as the theological father of Hauerwas’ pragmatic theology. As Hauerwas notes, Aquinas did not believe that philosophy derived its validity directly from scripture. “The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved through natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to [theological] science comes through revelation, and not through natural reason.”⁶ For Aquinas, therefore, the theologian and the philosopher work independently but learn something significant from one another. Within the environment of contemporary discourse, Preller located Aquinas’ philosophic dialogue partner in Wittgenstein of the *Investigations*.

Three features of Preller’s Wittgenstein attract Hauerwas the most. First is his critique of modern philosophy’s effort to reduce any lived “system” of life to some finite system of propositions (such as the one portrayed in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*). The second is Wittgenstein’s attention to the wonder of our individual perceptions of the world. The third is Wittgenstein’s rediscovering something like this wonder within the linguistic practices that limn everyday social existence. Each of our judgments about the world receives its life not only from what we see but also from the living complex of social-linguistic practices that enable us to see. I have on occasion urged Hauerwas to adopt Charles Peirce as his mentor in pragmatism, not James, and I have not received clear resistance. With that modest encouragement, I will suggest that Peirce provides both the pragmatic critique of naturalism that Hauerwas admires in James and a non-prejudicial account of the presuppositions of our knowledge of nature: one that not only acknowledges the legitimacy of Christian presuppositions but also grounds pragmatism in the Gospel witness. What, then, of Wittgenstein? I believe Peirce adds something to Preller’s Wittgenstein as well. Wittgenstein is a wonderful exponent of Peirce’s pragmatism as applied to the philosophy of language

use, but he fails to bring forward other features of pragmatism that I believe are necessary for joining philosophic reasoning to prophetic witness. For the sake of brevity, I will focus on one of these features: the capacity to account for and contribute to the power of language communities to change in response to their own failures.

As Preller reads Wittgenstein, our individual perceptions of the world are sources of wonder whose effects on us are displayed through the way we act in the world and toward each other. The instrument of this display is what we call understanding or thought, most broadly put, and the medium of understanding and thought is the language we speak, as embodied in our community of speech and action. In this way, Preller's Wittgenstein speaks of the wonders that enter, through the gates of perception, into our beliefs and actions and thus our communities of speech and action. The Peirce that I am recommending to Hauerwas provides a complementary account: "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason."⁷ Peirce also has much to say about the wondrous features of perception (he call these the elements of "surprise" and of "abduction" in our thinking) and about how these features are known through their effects on our understanding ("our logical thought," or our thinking in relation to the world of experience) as it is embodied in our communities of thought and belief. Peirce provides something else, however, that I do not observe in Preller's Wittgenstein: an account of how the wondrous elements of perception and of communal practice also emerge as sources of repair and redemption in times of personal and communal shipwreck – when our understanding appears confused, our languages fail to articulate what we experience, and our communities of speech and action appear dysfunctional. In other words, Preller's Wittgenstein helps me account for my community's life in the world when we appear to have a life in the community, but not when things appear to fall apart: when what we seek is not the order of this world of language and practice but the transformation of a now troubled or even dying world into one in which we may live again.

For Peirce, wonder marks more than one phenomenon. Yes, it may mark the sheer whatness of what there is in our world. But it may also mark the terrible suffering of our world. And it may also mark the power of repair and redemption that lies hidden until the wounds of our world break open. I recommend Peirce to Hauerwas, because Peirce's pragmatism offers a cogent philosophic account of

these second two marks. I believe Preller's Wittgenstein remains a significant resource when it is extended by this kind of pragmatism.⁸

Marks of Hauerwas's Prophetic-and-Pragmatic or Reparative Reasoning

Is Hauerwas therefore a pragmatist? If Peirce is a model, then yes. But is this not to characterize Hauerwas, first, as a philosopher? No. Peirce's pragmatism emerged out of his reparative critique of the modern philosophy of science. Appropriate to its object, Peirce's pragmatism is thus articulated in the language of philosophy, but there are other ways to speak pragmatically. Our study of Amos' words suggests, in fact, that pragmatism may have a prophetic lineage. And this may, as well, be the as yet unspoken implication of Peirce's Matthean emblem: Jesus says, "Ye may know [the truth of prophecies] by their fruits." Consider, therefore the fruits of Amos' prophecy.

Amos's Reparative Reasoning

Amos's prophecy appeared on the occasion of major crises in the nation of Israel. The first mark of pragmatic reasoning – or, what we may more felicitously call "reparative reasoning"⁹ is therefore reasoning in response to a profound interruption in one's community of speech and action.

In Amos' reasoning, the next mark is to diagnose the source of this interruption, which Amos finds to be both external to the community (such as the earthquake of Amos 1 or, we may add, the Assyrian invasion of Isaiah 28 on) and internal (the behavior of Israel as a nation, and Judah.) (Were the source merely internal, there would be no clear public evidence to capture the nation's attention; were the source merely external, there would be reparative action to take.) The second mark is thus to read a material threat to the nation as symptom of an as yet invisible disorder within the national community. Reasoning from consequent (threat) to antecedent (disorder) is a species of what Peirce calls "retroductive reasoning" or "abduction" (his favorite name for the way one reasons from the threat to a plausible vision of what can be done about it).¹⁰

The third mark is another level of retroduction: reading the disorder in the nation as symptomatic of *the nation's collective sin or error* (*chet*, "sin" in Hebrew is literally "missing the mark"). This prophetic retroduction is neither a strictly human activity of diagnosis nor a strictly divine disclosure through the prophet's voice (as through Balaam's ass).

The fourth mark is that there is a moment when the *prophet's reasoning and God's voice are* mutually indistinguishable. This is a mark to reconsider in treatments of philosophic pragmatism: that, at a certain point, pragmatic reasoning summons the divine voice and proceeds – if at all – only by way of this

voice. To be sure, this is the mark that modern philosophers refuse to acknowledge, as if they had indubitable grounds for knowing, a priori, that the realms of science and the divine do not mix.¹¹

The fifth mark may illustrate an immediate occasion for the Matthean formula: *the prophet's public proclamation*. "He proclaimed, The Lord roars from Zion, Shouts aloud from Jerusalem... Thus said the Lord: For three transgressions of Damascus, For four, I will not revoke it" (Amos 1:2, 3). Here, the public is told for the first time that a material threat is, in fact, symptomatic of an inner disorder and that the disorder is symptomatic of their collective sin.

The fifth mark thus implies a sixth: that this proclamation is a call for public action. To say there is sin here is to say that, were the sin removed, there may be hope for relief from the disorder and thus from the external threat the nation now suffers. God alone decides, so that pragmatic "repair" is probable at best.

Hauerwas's Reparative Reasoning.

The six marks of Amos's reparative reasoning may also be observed in Hauerwas's. For economy of reporting, I will look, for the most part, to a single essay of Hauerwas' for illustrations of these six marks:

*"What Could it Mean for The Church to Be Christ's Body? A Question without a Clear Answer."*¹²

Mark #1: responding to profound interruptions in a shared tradition, community, or relation.

Hauerwas frames his essay as a commentary on how the feast of the Ascension is observed in the village of Sneem, Ireland. What does it mean, he asks, "to dress up young girls to become brides of Christ"? According to the essay, it means that following Christ means joining the body of Christ, and that is not something one can do with mind and spirit alone. The body matters. A sub-frame for the essay displays another way the body matters: in this case, the body of Hauerwas's own feelings, relationships, reactions. As on many occasions, he offers the essay, in part, as an argument against his critics, or, in this case, against two friends who have, in his opinion, mis-characterized his work as "proposing that the Christian community focus on its own identity"(21).¹³ His self-defense will complement his reflections on Sneem, since his account of the Church as a body will be offered as an alternative to both individualistic and communitarian accounts.¹⁴

Within these frames, Hauerwas delivers the central lesson of the essay: that his theological writing is offered only in response to what he believes are profound interruptions in the life of the Church today (and over the past decades). For Hauerwas, a theological lesson is made in response to something really practical and really wrong; otherwise it is not a theological lesson, but some spiritualized meditation. What's really wrong is that the unity of the Church – and thus the unity of the body of Christ – is threatened by the regnant

theo-political paradigms of how to live in the church and of how the church lives in the world. What's really practical is that these paradigms, while articulable in the languages of academy theology, are defined only as they are lived day to day.

Mark #2: diagnosing both external and internal conditions of the interruptions. Hauerwas's theopractic reasoning turns on the claim that threats to the unity of the Church today are not mere accidents of history. They are, more significantly, symptoms of recent Christian commitment to a series of dichotomous paradigms: divided, for example, between loyalties to faith or reason, body or spirit, ethics or liturgy, Rome or the nation state, individualism or communitarianism, Jew or Greek, sola scriptura or traditio. Hauerwas therefore writes, for example, of the inseparability of body from church:

Lumen Gentium quite rightly assumes that questions about the status of the church as "the body of Christ" are inseparable from questions of government. Such a practice is necessary for a reading of the Pauline stress on the body if we are to avoid the ontology of the body so characteristic of liberalism – i.e., that my "body" is an instrument for the expression of my 'true self.'" (24)¹⁵

Hauerwas's secondary claim – and the theme of much of his writing – is that such binaries inform academic theology and ecclesial scholarship as well as individual and institutional practices in the churches. This means that Hauerwas's critics will be those who, thinking within those binaries, mistake his critique of binarism per se with what they fear is a critique of the binary pole they endorse. Assuming that he is endorsing the opposite pole, they therefore tend to respond with some aggressive defense of one against the other. As illustrated in this essay, Hauerwas often returns the aggression: offering them a carefully drawn non-binary argument that is also spiced, in places, with a more binary-sounding rhetoric of defense. He writes, for example,

I have, after all, been labeled a "sectarian fideistic tribalist" who is calling for the church to beat a retreat from the world. (20)

I must be more emphatic in my rejection of the description of being a communitarian. (25)

Interlocutors may choose to respond reactively to the rhetoric or more soberly to the argument. Either way, Hauerwas's response may confound their habits of separating theological and philosophic analyses from moral and religious judgment (Mark #3), of separating rational argument from theological witness (Mark #4), or of separating argument from concrete practice (Marks #5-6).

Mark #3: reading inner disorder as a symptom of sin and moral trespass. Hauerwas's claims about threats to the unity of the Church lead to claims about who is responsible for these threats: the members of the Church. I believe Hauerwas responds to such questions in the tradition of Amos. For Amos, each nation is responsible for its behavior: if it sins against God's will, the nation will suffer; if it repents of its sins, it may win relief from its suffering and regain the Creator's blessings. Unlike "blood guilt," Amos's theodicy cannot be justified on the basis of merely efficient causality. As in **the words of Isaiah X, "Can a lion roar and not be heard?"** natural causality is Amos's metaphor for the indirect rule of divine justice: God alone judges if and when a certain act of sin or of repentance will bear its good or evil fruit. Hauerwas's theodicy appears to be analogous to Amos's. To hold each church member responsible for contributing to the unity of the body of Christ is not to make a claim of efficient causality but of divine justice. It is to argue that: (a) the unity of the Church is threatened by binary paradigms of Christian life; (b) church members have the freedom to affirm such paradigms or not; and (c) to affirm them is sin (threatening the unity of the body of Christ intentionally or unintentionally).

Mark #4: where divine and human voices meet. This is the defining – and most challenging – mark of Hauerwas's theopractic reasoning, for it answers what I take to be the bottom-line question: "What, after all, is non-binary in Hauerwas's own reasoning?" The answer is that the non-binary elements of his thinking are elements in which divine and human voices cannot be distinguished. Readers committed to binary paradigms will object. Rationalists may protest that this claim of co-presence is itself a theological claim, since it introduces God into what we know only in human terms. Fideists may protest that this claim of co-presence is itself a rationalist claim, since it implies that theological judgments are marked by human finitude and cannot therefore refer infallibly to God. I understand Hauerwas's overall response to be that the claims of both faith and reason co-present in the non-binary elements of his reasoning and that non-binary claims can be proven "only by their fruit."

If asked, for example, if the Church is a community of persons or part of Christ, Hauerwas answers, "What is crucial... is not whether the Church is primarily understood as 'the body of Christ' or 'the people of God,' but whether the practices exist through which we learn that our bodies are not 'ours'" (24).¹⁶ Our bodies are not our own because we have been given a new body by the Spirit (I Cor. 6:12-20). The Spirit does not render us all-spirit, however, but body-and-spirit or body-with-others and others-with-God: all these are what we mean by non-binary relations, manifested in the non-binary practices of communities of persons,

prototypically the body of Christ. To say that this body includes individual bodies is to say that it lives historically, extended through time and space. Only in space-time can the human and divine share in one body. “I seek therefore not for the church to be a community, but rather to be a body constituted by disciplines that create the capacity to resist the disciplines of the body associated with the modern nation-state and in particular the economic habits that support that state”(26).

As illustrated in Hauerwas’s writing, the claims of non-binary reasoning cannot be directly affirmed or formulated through the series of binary reasonings that we tend to author as individuals. Nevertheless, non-binary reasoning includes individual reasonings within its movement, for each individual reasoning marks a particular space-time, by way of which it opens non-binary reasoning to its place within concrete history. And why do individual reasonings fill this unique role? In Peirce’s terms, it is because “the individual [may be] marked only by ignorance and error.” While overstating his point, Peirce uncovers the defining lesson of Marks#1-4: individual reasonings, alone, bear witness to profound interruptions in a given tradition and community; therefore, individual reasonings alone occasion prophetic witness and pragmatic repair.¹⁷ For this reason, prophetic-and-pragmatic reasoning may be re-described as the species of non-binary reasoning that interprets individual reasonings as marks of societal distress and that initiates a society’s reparative response to such marks. Such reparative reasoning appears in the form of particular projects of repair, each of which bears marks comparable to those we have attributed to Amos and, now, to Hauerwas.

Hauerwas names the ultimate source of repair Jesus Christ, fully human, fully God. He implies that this repairer (“redeemer”) is not outside of our reasoning but is the ground of reparative reasoning in the Church; this ground should be summoned directly in times like this when members of the Church may forget that this ground is not only implicit in their power of reasoning but also available to them as an active agent of repair. Jesus Christ is the identity of the God “who comes when we call.” In “*What Could it Mean for The Church to Be Christ’s Body?*,” Hauerwas emphasizes the embodied character of the redeemer as a corrective to spiritualizing tendencies in the church today. To bear witness to the embodied Christ is to bear witness to the God who can redeem His creatures because He is already present in and to the individual of flesh and blood whose cry (and whose reasoning) He hears as a call for societal repair.¹⁸

Returning to our discussion of Preller’s Wittgenstein, we need to address one more challenge posed by Mark #4. Preller provided Hauerwas a philosophic warrant for knowledge-claims about the divine-human encounter: Christological presuppositions are as valid as any other successful ground of language use, where

“success” is measured by sustained use. While acknowledging this warrant, I suggested that Preller’s Wittgenstein fails to provide Hauerwas an account of how language systems may be transformed in response to catastrophic change. Mark #4 is evidence that Hauerwas relies on such an account and that it is grounded in a Christology that is, at once, prophetic and pragmatic. In this account, therefore, “Christology” refers to the source not only of some Christian “language game,” but also of the repair and renewal of any distressed or moribund Christian language game. It refers, in other words, to the source of Christian reparative reasoning, public knowledge of which is as reliable as any other reparative practice. As we have seen, such knowledge is displayed in non-binary reasonings, of which each claim is irreducible to the binary, either/or terms of everyday language use. In Peirce’s terms, such claims are “irremediably vague,” which means (a) that these are truth claims about actual entities in the world, but (b) that they do not predicate either one of any pair of binary attributes of those entities, except (c) in relation to an individual observer: so that an otherwise “vague” (or partially indeterminate) claim about some entity is made determinate only in relation to a given subject or observer. In plain-speak: one may say “Christ shall redeem us from this distress,” but most details about how specifically Christ “redeems us” are offered only with respect to an historically specific event of repair or redemption, as disclosed according to a particular witness. For Peirce, and I trust for Hauerwas, these epistemological rules apply comparably to Christological and scientific claims about what is there in the world and how it may be repaired.¹⁹

Mark #5: public proclamation. And Mark #6: call to public action.

Does the Christian reparative reasoner encounter Jesus Christ in Scripture or in “experience” (in reparative engagement with real problems in the world)? For Hauerwas, as I read him, such a question replays one of those modern binaries. As reparative reasoner, Hauerwas encounters Jesus Christ as always in Scripture and in the world. This also means that Scripture cannot be defined, dichotomously, as “this book of words here” as opposed to “this Christ who lived there” (or “who lives in my heart and practice”). Like any real entity, Scripture is encountered as a vague entity, identified only in its relation to the knower in space and time. It carries additional significance as both a thing in the world and a word: a message sent from one to another, like a letter addressed to the reader. Whoever the sender, such a message has at least four elements: the “signifying thing” (like black ink on parchment that signifies something to someone), the person who sends the message (or many persons, each defined only as a being who can communicate to another being), the person who receives it (or many persons), and its “meaning” (what the receiver

understands the message to be). Scripture carries additional significance as a word understood to be sent by God to the community covenanted with God. For Christians (particularly postliberal and most Patristic Christians) as well as Jews, “Israel” is the prototype of such a community. The Church is grafted onto Israel and her Covenant, becoming thereby another recipient of God’s word. While not all postliberal scholars make this distinction, it seems to me that Israel’s Torah remains the prototype of Scripture for postliberal (and others forms of) Christianity as well as for Judaism. Gospel and New Testament are Scripture of a different sort: received by the Church not as divine revelation, *per se*, but as the Apostles’ divinely inspired witness to the life of God incarnate in the Jew Jesus Christ. Jesus interprets his life as an interpretation of the Torah; Paul follows suit, so that by declaring Jesus’ life a fulfillment of Israel’s covenant, the New Testament becomes not only a “completion of” but also a reading of the Old Testament. Scripture also has significance as a “face” of God: a manifestation of what God does among us and thereby a primary means of entering into intimate relation with the one who redeems and repairs.

For Christian reparative reasoners, the Gospel narrative is witness to the source and paradigm of reparative reasoning; participating in that paradigm, they become members of the redeemer’s body. As a Jewish reader, I find a parallel in classic rabbinic teachings about Israel’s relation to Torah as God’s revealing and redeeming word. In the Exodus narrative, God hears Israel’s cries and delivers His saving word on behalf of Israel. For the rabbinic sages, Torah offers instruction in how to serve as agents of Israel’s repair. For the medieval kabbalists, those who participate in the Torah are agents, as well, of *tikkun olam*, or the repair of God’s creation overall. To study and interpret Torah (*l’drosh et ha-torah*) is also to act in the way of Torah as an agent of repair and redemption in this world.

Trinitarian and ecclesial reasoning: How, then, by way of reading Scripture, do Christians participate in Christ’s reparative presence? Hauerwas offers a concise response in an earlier essay:

In this transformation of the disciples we see the central theme of the Gospel. To be a disciple of Jesus it is not enough to know the basic “facts” of his life. . . . Rather to be a disciple of Jesus means that our lives literally be taken up into the drama of God’s redemption of this creation. That is the work of the Spirit as we are made part of God’s new time though the life and work of this, Jesus of Nazareth.

That is why the Trinity is such a central affirmation to sustain the Christian life. The Trinity is not metaphysical speculation about God’s

nature in and of itself but rather is our affirmation that God has chosen to include us in his salvific work....

At Pentecost God created a new language, but it was a language that is more than words. It is instead a community whose memory of its savior creates the miracle of being a people whose very differences contribute to their unity.

We call this new creation church. It is constituted by word and sacrament, as the story we tell, the story we embody, must not only be told but enacted.... In the enactment, in Baptism and Eucharist, we are made part of a common history that requires continuous celebration to be rightly remembered.... Though this telling and enactment we, like Israel, become a people who live by distinctively remembering the history of God's redemption of the world.²⁰

Christians thus enter the work of reparative reasoning by becoming disciples of Christ and members of the Church as the one body of Christ. This also means that Christians become disciples of Christ by entering the work of reparative reasoning. Reparative reasoning is thus Trinitarian and ecclesial reasoning as well. Mark #5 names the moment of this reasoning that proclaims who and what will be the source of repair. Hauerwas's writing and teaching appear to constitute the marks of proclamation in his reparative reasoning. Mark #6 names the call to action that completes his individual projects of reasoning: calling himself and others members of the Church to follow Christ in the work of repair. What follows this call is beyond the limits of his distinct contribution to reparative reasoning, for it belongs to the work of the Church and of salvation history.²¹

Reasoning with Israel: As "What Could it Mean..." progresses, from its narrative of Sneem through its diagnosis of the sources of disunity in the Church, Hauerwas draws the story of Israel increasingly into his reparative reasoning. I believe the reason is that, for Hauerwas, Israel is the ground of one's embodiment in the Church, and this essay looks to the body as means of repairing an overly spiritualized – and rationalized – Church. This does not imply some dichotomy of Israel/body vs. Church/spirit, since Hauerwas reads body and spirit as always integrated. When the Church is unified, then it should be as embodied as Israel is embodied. When it is not unified, then it is dis-embodied, and what it is missing is not its body in a literal sense (for that cannot be removed) but its memory of how to practice embodied religious life.²² I assume that, for Hauerwas, the term "the body" does not refer to any separable entity but is shorthand for the wisdom and events that embody Christian practice in the world.²³

Like the Jews, Christians are called to be a community and a people capable of remembering: indeed this is their first social task. But the “social ethics” of the church is not first of all what the church can or should do to make the societies in which it exists more just. The church does not have a social ethic in that sense, but rather the church is a social ethic as it serves this or any society by first being the kind of community capable of nourishing its life by the memory of God’s presence in Jesus Christ,

But if that is the case, the great social challenge for Christians is learning how to remember the history of the Jews, as party of and as essential to our history. Such remembering cannot be based on feeling guilty about the Holocaust, since guilt soon fades or becomes a substitute for honest appraisal. Rather we must learn to remember with the Jews a history which certainly includes the Holocaust because we are learning that the Jews are our partners in discerning God’s way in the world. To learn to remember in this manner is a radical political act in that it must of necessity change our understanding of the Christian community and its relationship to our world.²⁴

In a note to this comment, Hauerwas cites with favor the following comments by André Trocmé:

The more the strict monotheistic faith in the God of Israel is exalted, the more visible becomes the thought of Jesus Christ. Let us never forget that the God of Jesus Christ was the God of Israel. The Christian faith dissolves into mythology as soon as it no longer leans upon Judaism. Nothing can be lost by rejudaizing Christianity. Judaism is the point of departure for all research destined to discover the Jesus of history.²⁵

There is an additional way to understand Hauerwas’s remembering Israel. As noted earlier, Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning moves from symptoms of disunity in the Church to hypotheses about the sources of this disunity and about resources for repair. We noted that this reasoning locates causes or antecedents within rather than outside of the tradition marked by these symptoms of disunity. This “look within” lends prophecy its moral and religious force, so that, through prophets like Amos, Israel is commanded to take responsibility for whatever it suffers.²⁶ A defining mark of Peirce’s pragmatism is the difference between “taking responsibility” and being named “efficient cause.” If Israel takes responsibility for its being attacked by Assyria (Is. 10:5), this does not mean Israel has been identified as the efficient cause of its own suffering. Nor does it mean that its guilt is a mere metaphor for its free choice to make each suffering a condition for moral action. These two alternatives belong to a binary analysis of the Deuteronomic theodicy, and they are inadequate to a pragmatic reading of the Matthean formula.²⁷ There are two, complementary pragmatic readings: that Israel’s sins engender the possibility of (or cannot prevent

against) Assyrian oppression and that God reads Israel's sin as a reasonable warrant for His sending Assyria against her:

Ha! Assyria, rod of My wrath,
In whose hand, as a staff, is My fury!
I send him against an ungodly nation,
I charge him against a people that provokes Me.(Is. 10:5-6,7-8.)

Isaiah tells us unambiguously that Assyria's will works only in the world of efficient causality, governed by its perverted and un-seeing intelligence, which would, of its own impulse, lead it against Israel and all surrounding nations:

His mind harbors evil designs;
For he means to destroy,
To wipe out nations, not a few,
For he thinks,
After all, I have kings as my captains! (Is. 10:7-8.)

Divine causality, in other words, reads out of and acts into the world of efficient causes but neither belongs to that world nor warrants each causal chain in that world. Yes, God creates a world of efficient cause, but no, occasionalists err if they say God re-asserts His will on behalf of each act in that world. Yes, He neither sleeps nor slumbers, but He speaks His will through words rather than brute force, and these are not mere words like ours, but efficacious words whose force is displayed in each event of this world, but whose character we cannot simply infer from those events. To see God's hand in the events of this world is to read these events by way of imaginative hypothesis-making ("retroductively," in Peirce's terms). Trying to see God's hand is thus a precarious enterprise, since it passes through a faculty – the imagination— that at some levels is inseparable from the realm of fantasy. Sober folks warn wisely against "religion," because they accurately observe the fairy-tale dimension of religious imagination. But, seeking at all cost to protect us from illusion, sober folks err when they suppress the imagination in favor of a world of "strict reality." The result is the more damning illusion that we live in a world of merely literal causes and effects, in which all non-binary relations are deemed unreal.

Hauerwas offers his theopractic reasoning to repair Christian institutions that have been re-ordered and thus dis-ordered by sober folks of this kind and by their complements –the anti-efficient yet equally binary thinkers who have, perhaps out of feeling hearts but weak minds, sought to reclaim the realm of religion by defining it as not of this world at all but of another. They claim that, to enter this "spirit world"

we must pass by the world of efficient causality altogether, entering instead through stories of another world. Hauerwas believes he inherits a Church over-peopled by both sober folks and fantasy folks, dis-integrated into mutually delegitimizing camps of materialists and spiritualists. His practice of retroduction belongs to neither camp (however much each camp sees his work as handiwork of the other), because each part of it is non-binary, linking some mark of distress in the churches' this-worldly life to some point of distress in the relation of Christ's body to the Triune life. In his terms, this Triune life is the life of the Redeemer who is with Israel in her suffering and with His Son in His suffering and with the poor in their suffering; to invoke this life is to invoke the One for whom each mark of distress is a call for His redeeming work.

What does this invocation mean, practically, for the future life of the Church? Hauerwas's response (his second level of retroduction) is to link God's redeeming presence, per hypothesis, to a set of recommended behaviors in the churches. These correspond to the prophet's call for Israel to repent and to the pragmatist's theory about how a society in distress may re-awaken its deepest and neglected habits of belief to repair the elemental conditions of social life. I believe that Hauerwas reads the story of Israel and the life of the Jews as marks of how, God willing, the churches may be repaired today. I imagine that his reasoning (retroduction) proceeds through successive cycles of these 6 Marks: moving from symptoms of ecclesial distress to visions of ecclesial repair then repeating the movement again to disclose successively "deeper" levels of antecedent church practice. Through such cycles, he would uncover elemental challenges to church unity complemented by elemental rules of ecclesial repair. To some degree, the order of this reasoning would reverse the order of salvation history. If, for example, Hauerwas sought rules for repairing confusions about the relations of Son and Holy Spirit to Father, then his reasoning might lead to claims about the council of Nicaea. If, however, he sought rules for repairing confusions about body and spirit, then his reasoning might lead to earlier portrayals of the church as Israel and, thence, to the life of Israel herself. This does not mean to Israel as some nation outside of the Church nor as a metaphor for some Jerusalem of the spirit. This comment from an Orthodox website may well capture the force of Hauerwas's retroduction:

God working in history, "salvation history," is the characteristic mark of every aspect of our faith. The Church's task, therefore, is both to preach and present what God has done, what God is doing and what God will do to save and re-create. The Church, being the Qahal, the Ecclesia, stretching back to the dawn of time, therefore includes all the righteous as saints, both before and after the coming of the Messiah. So, in the Orthodox Church, the patriarchs, prophets, kings and righteous ones of

the former covenants are all gloriously commemorated in our Calendar. They also partake of Christ. As Jesus Himself said to his fellow Jews:

"Your father Abraham rejoiced that he was to see my day; he saw it and was glad." The Jews said to him, "You are not yet 50 years old, and you have seen Abraham?" Jesus said to them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, before Abraham was, I am." [John 8:56-58]

The Orthodox Church, therefore, includes all the salvation history of the Jews, because this was the Church before Christ. Unlike the west, therefore, we do not say that the Church was born at Pentecost. The Church was born in the Garden of Eden! We recall that St. Irenaeus represented the Fathers generally by saying that in Christ, the whole of Creation has been recapitulated.²⁸

The statement captures many features of Hauerwas's references to Israel, except that he does not introduce salvation history as a grand narrative but as a means of uncovering resources for repairing specific ailments. He concludes that, for what ails it today, the church needs the medicine of Israel's narrative, re-membering its primordial calling as an assembly grafted onto the covenanted people and guided by God's revealed word. In this view, to forget Israel is to forget some of the defining elements of Church life; to re-member Israel is to re-affirm dimensions of the Church that are always Israel. For Hauerwas, this is not "Judaizing," but a means of reaffirming what it means to be disciples of Christ.²⁹

Why does Hauerwas bother with the Jews since rabbinic times? Is not Israel of Scripture enough? Hauerwas appears to reason, with Lindbeck, that Israel-likeness alone would offer a necessary but not sufficient resource for repairing binary tendencies in the Church today. I do not have any neat formula to suggest here, but the following elements appear to be ingredient in Hauerwas's reparative attention to the Jews:

- Observing Jews today means perceiving the historical reality of God's promises. This is a vital exercise for stimulating Christians to remember daily that the God of the Church is the God who fulfills His promises. This practice strengthens Christian will to turn aside from the temptations of both sobriety and fantasy, to attend instead to the corporeal Jesus Christ.
- For Hauerwas, the communal form of Diaspora rabbinic Judaism introduces Christians to several features of Church life after modernity, many of which correspond to Yoder's Anabaptist model of the Israel-like Church: Christianity as a minority religion, guided by a politics of ecumenical life and various forms of

settlement with non-Christian neighbors and powers; Christian communal life within a broader secular polity, centered around study, social practice, worship, and Scripturally-grounded witness.

Christians in the West are just beginning to live the way Jews have had to live since Christians took over the world by making Caesar a member of the church. Put simply, we must learn from Jews how to survive in a world that is not constituted by the recognition, much less the worship of our God. In the process, Christians may not only learn from the wisdom Jews have hewn from their struggle to survive Christianity, but we may even learn that our destiny is inseparable from the destiny of the Jews. I am convinced, however, that Christians cannot learn that lesson if, in an attempt to appear tolerant, we pretend that our ethics can be divorced from the conviction that God through Jesus' life, death, and resurrection has made us nothing less than heirs of Abraham. Accordingly, I believe Jewish theological readings of Christianity must face the challenge that the existence of Christianity is not a mistake, but rather one of the ways God desires to make His covenant with Israel known to the nations.³⁰

- The rabbis' scriptural hermeneutic (midrash) and their scripture-based social law (halakhah) remind Christians how to recover two defining practices of the early Church. Midrash reads individual Biblical texts as always authoritative but always "vague," here a technical term for the fact that each text delivers a clear meaning only as applied to some historically specific context of meaning. A different context will disclose a different dimension of meaning. This is not relativism but an understanding of the Bible as God's living speech to Israel.³¹ Halakhah provides guidelines for determining how biblically-based rules of practice get practiced in historically specific contexts of life. The wisdom here parallels that of midrash: God's will must be enacted in the concrete details of everyday life, and it takes a prayer-filled heart, a world-wise mind, and a humble sense of human fallibility to hear how that will may be spoken to each context of life.

The New Testament obviously includes, particularly in the letters of Paul, an on-going critique of the law. Paul says that those in Christ have 'died to the law' so that they might "belong to him who has been raised from the dead," and so bear fruit for God" (Rom. 7:4-6; Gal. 2:19). Now that Christ has come, those who still try to keep the law (by being circumcised or maintaining ritual purity) cut themselves off from Christ and lose his benefits (Gal. 5:2-6). Yet, as Bruce Marshall maintains, these New Testament passages are not "again the law itself, but against treating the law and its observances as the way to salvation," a view that

is not incompatible with the understanding of the law within Judaism. Marshall notes that Jews understand “their obedience to the commandments as acts of gratitude and thanksgiving to God for his electing love towards the Jewish people, and not as a means to salvation or so some other end.”³²

- While necessary for its own sake, this discipline of learning from the Jews also helps Christians repent, in part, of the sin of anti-Jewishness.

Put as starkly as I can put it: if Christian envy of the Jews is ever so effective that we are able to destroy the last Jew from the face of the earth, then God will destroy the earth. Our God is not some generalized spirit, but a fleshy God whose body is the Jews. (fn)

Reasoning like Paul: apocalyptic pragmatism

There is only one step left in our review of these marks of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning: to identify what ecclesial model Hauerwas adopts for reasoning like the prophets and the pragmatists and with Israel. I trust he would say: the Apostle Paul! In Paul among the Postliberals, Douglas Harink suggests that Hauerwas joins all the postliberals in adopting Paul as their primary teacher. In light of Harink’s work, I would dub Hauerwas’s Pauline reasoning “apocalyptic pragmatism,” where, in Harink’s terms “‘apocalypse’ is shorthand for Jesus Christ. In the New Testament, in particular for Paul, all apocalyptic reflections and hope comes to this, that God has acted critically, decisively, and finally for Israel, all the peoples of the earth, and the entire cosmos, in the life, death, resurrection, and coming again of Jesus...”³³ Drawing illustrations from Harink’s reading of Galatians (with supplementary comments from Ronald Sider), I will comment on five marks of apocalyptic pragmatism in Hauerwas’s reading of Paul, roughly corresponding to the six marks of Hauerwas’s prophetic pragmatism.

(1) Apocalyptic pragmatism overall.

Hauerwas imitates a Paul (a) whose attention is drawn to specific wounds in historically specific communities of the church; (b) who diagnoses each wound as symptom of a community’s turning away from disciplined discipleship in favor of merely human desires; (c) who searches (retroductively) for deeper sources of repair within the church, the most profound wounds leading him to the deepest sources of repair; (d) who encounters the apocalypse in his encounter with Jesus Christ as redeemer or ultimate source of repair for wounds that cannot be mended by any creaturely means; (e) who therefore calls the wounded community to repent of its divisive ways, while recognizing that

repentance is not a matter of human will alone: the community's errors have exposed a wound in the creature qua creature, and this can be mended only when the human community finds its prayer is met by divine grace. Perhaps Paul's most general lesson in pragmatism is this:

For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. For the earnest expectation of the creation eagerly waits for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself also will be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. (Romans 8:18-21)

Perhaps Hauerwas's most general, Pauline lesson is this: "Christians are the community of a new age that must continue to exist in the old age [2 Cor. 5:16-17]."³⁴

(2) Attention to specific wounds within specific communities of the Church.³⁵

The paradigm here is general to Paul's mission: Paul addresses each of his letters to a specific community of the Church in response to specific threats to this community's identity as member of the Church. The letters are therefore explicitly reparative and context specific: each letter offered (i) to a specific community, (ii) as a reparative word, (iii) on behalf of the Redeemer. Thus "I am astonished that you so quickly desert him who called you in the grace of Christ and turn to a different gospel, not that there is another gospel, but there are some who trouble you and want to pervert the gospel of Christ"(Gal 1.7). Here, Hauerwas echoes Yoder's Pauline attention to historical context.

Sider states the case elegantly:

When the apostle Paul wrote in various contexts throughout the epistolary literature of the New Testament about the diversity of spiritual gifts within the Christian movement, he was not (only or merely) making the point made since within humanistic anthropologies that each person is unique.. .. Paul rather, says Yoder, organizes his discussion of the ecclesial recognition of each member around the diversity of gifts, not simply as an awareness of ubiquitous unique qualities, but as social functions appropriate to the body of Christ and (therefore) empowered by the Holy Spirit. This, in turn, makes sense only within a context of dialogical vulnerability.³⁶

In Paul's manner, Hauerwas's aim is "to remind Christians that we are in a life-and-death struggle with the world."³⁷ In Harink's words, "Such a struggle, or warfare, is always engaged in the specific awareness that real enemies pose real threats."³⁸

(3) *Diagnosing each community's distress as a specific case of failed discipleship.*³⁹

Several sub-marks merit attention:

- a. Each case displays symptoms of divisiveness that extend from everyday social phenomena *to the community's sharing* in the elemental wounds of creation itself.

Thus, "Formerly, when you did not know God, you were in bondage to beings that by nature are no gods; but now that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly elemental spirits, whose slaves you want to be once more?" (Gal 4:7). And "You were running well; who hindered you from obeying the truth?" (Gal. 4:9). As for divisiveness, Hauerwas offers "What Could it Mean..." as a critique of tendencies to define ecclesial practices by such binaries as Israel's Covenant against the Church, communal vs. bodily life, or theology vs. ethics.⁴⁰ Sider devotes his book, specifically, to Yoder's critique of such binaries:

John Howard Yoder. . . probed deeply into the wound left in the contemporary Christian conscience by the opposition between holiness and difficulty. In the chapter of Yoder's monumental book, *The Politics of Jesus*, entitled "Trial Balance," he delineated a series of dualisms that seem fundamental for Christian theology and repeat the opposition between holiness and difficulty. Moreover, each requires unfaithfulness of the Christian. Among the dualisms, Yoder contended that "The systematic tradition tells us we must choose between the political and the sectarian."⁴¹

In "The Servant Community," Hauerwas offers a comparable critique:

The scandal of the disunity of the church is even more painful when we recognize this social task [that the "Church is a social ethic"]. For all too often it appears that we who have been called to be the foretaste of the peaceable kingdom fail to maintain unity among ourselves. As a result we abandon the world to its own devices. The divisions I speak of in the church are not only those based on doctrine, history, or practices, important though they are. The deepest and most painful divisions affecting the church in America are those based on class, race, and nationality that we have sinfully accepted as written into the nature of things.⁴²

b. The wounds are prototypically political, such as the separation of merely human rule from *the rule of God's word*.

For Harink, Paul's apocalypticism is prototypically political, as illustrated in Yoder's efforts "in The Politics of Jesus to persuade readers that the writings of the New Testament present Jesus as 'a model of radical political action,' that is, as the normative bodily enactment of God's political will for God's people."⁴³ For Yoder, this political will now requires Christians to renounce Constantianism, which is to renounce direct participation as Christians in the mechanisms of nation-state governance. Following Louis Martyn, Harink reads such a politics as apocalyptic, since "Paul's talk of powers and principalities cannot be less than talk about the social and political shape of human existence.... So too, God's conquest of the powers in the cross of Christ, as the apocalypse, must be at least about the reshaping of the sociopolitical character of the community of the cross."⁴⁴ Paul's politics is thus eschatological, as well, since, "although the heavenly Jerusalem has come, it remains appropriate for the writer to remind the Hebrews that they have "here . . . no lasting city, but . . . are looking for the city that is to come" (Heb. 13:14). Hauerwas's political theology, says Harink, shares this apocalypticism with Paul and Yoder:

Right now the American church is under submission to "a yoke of slavery," "fallen away from grace," caught up in a dual allegiance to Christ and the liberal polis, and therefore standing under God's apocalyptic wrath, a situation in which "Christ will be of no benefit" in the coming judgment (cf. Gal 5:1-5).

Hauerwas seeks nothing less than the conversion from apostasy, the holiness, of American Christianity, which will come only with the flat-out rejection of the liberal state and its claim to be another or better gospel.⁴⁵

c. The wounds are ultimately those for which there is no mere creaturely remedy.⁴⁶ There are several sub-marks of this characteristic:

i. Remedies cannot be reduced to what serves the needs and discourses of individuals alone :

"I cannot imagine any teacher who is serious who would allow students to make up their own minds."⁴⁷

Readers do not need reminders of Hauerwas's manifold criticisms of Enlightenment individualism. These, says Harink, come in the spirit of Col. 2:8: "Beware lest any person spoil you through philosophy and vain conceit." Thus, Sider notes, "the rule of Paul is in fundamental continuity with MacIntyre's

assumption that specifically human flourishing relies on acknowledgment of what he calls ‘the virtues of acknowledged dependence.’”⁴⁸ Peirce writes of this kind of dependence when he refers to “the individual ego” as known only in “ignorance and in error”⁴⁹ – not that the individual has no worth, but that its worth is to call tradition and community to attention: something is wrong here! The community’s task is to respond by way of what Peirce calls the “social logic” of repair.⁵⁰ In Hauerwas’s terms, this is the logic of Jesus Christ: “faith for Paul is not some mystical transformation of the individual; rather it is to be initiated into a kingdom. Faith is not belief in certain propositions, though it involves the attitude and passion of trust. Faith is not so much a combination of belief and trust, as simply fidelity to Jesus, the initiator of God’s kingdom of peace.”⁵¹

ii. Remedies cannot be reduced to rational principles.

Hauerwas argues that one of the greatest failings of the modern church is to seek to comprehend Scripture and doctrine through strictly “rational” principles.⁵² I believe his lesson is that there is no need to call on God when creaturely reasoning will suffice: if the door is broken, the carpenter or locksmith will do. To call on God is to give witness to a wound for which there is no creaturely remedy. This is to appeal not to un-reason but to the One who, alone, has the power to reform and renew our very capacity to reason. Kantian rationality, for example, does not trump the gift of God’s word, because the autonomy Kant associates with rationality must be read, instead, as a mark only of that gift:

Kant ... argued that autonomy consists of doing our duty in accordance with the universal law of our being. Such an objection, however, fails to appreciate that for Christians freedom is literally a gift. We do not become free by conforming our actions to the categorical imperative but by being accepted as disciples and thus learning to imitate a master. Such discipleship can only appear heteronomous from the moral point of view, since the paradigm cannot be reduced to ... principles known prior to imitation.⁵³

iii. Remedies invoke the rule of love, which humans acquire as a grace.

Sider observes,

Yoder’s account of the essentially communal embodiment of holiness in the rule of Paul (open meeting) and the fullness of Christ (diversity of gifts) could be paraphrased as commentary on Paul’s exhortation in Romans 13:8, “Owe no one anything,

only love one another.” Here Paul subtly draws attention to our propensity to assume that the graciousness of love is dissociable from our normal contexts of negotiating with others, with owing people something. Prima facie, this makes some sense. Love characteristically happens to us.⁵⁴

In the same spirit, Hauerwas writes,

For Christians, marriage is not ultimately where one learns what love is about; indeed, the “love” that Christians share in marriage is made possible because we have first been loved by God.⁵⁵

d. Uncovering deeper sources of repair within the Church. The repair is ultimately apocalyptic, which means it comes only through encounter with Jesus Christ.⁵⁶

In Harink’s words,

Paul is himself the servant of only one apocalypse, one theme, one gospel, One God, the Father, and one Lord, Jesus Christ (Gal. 1:1-5). It is this Jesus Christ and God the Father “who raised him from the dead” who commissioned Paul as messenger of the singular gospel, the gospel of deliverance from “the present evil age” (Gal 1:4). God’s deed in raising Jesus from the dead is precisely that which determines the present time of Paul’s speech and sets it off from that other time which is also still ‘present’ but no longer determinate, the evil age of the old creation.⁵⁷

Harink notes that, while “Hauerwas rarely declares his own apocalypticism explicitly,” his clearest declarations come through others whom he cites with favor. One of these is William Stringfellow, who identifies three features of apocalypticism, each of which should ring familiar to Hauerwas’s readers: Apocalypticism (1) reminds us of the “intrinsically political character of salvation”; (2) rejects notions of the cosmos as “a seamless of casual relations; (3) sees “God’s creation [as] caught in a dramatic and final battle” in which God accomplishes the decisive victory in the death and resurrection of Jesus, leaving us free to participate in this victory rather than to try to accomplish it ourselves through optimistic social engineering or cynical violence. Such participation is very meaning of the Christian community.”⁵⁸

e. Human works, and thus works of the Law taken only as works, will not suffice to bring *Christ’s reparative presence*. A call for the wounded community to repent of its divisive ways and thus lend itself to God’s will in Jesus Christ.⁵⁹

“Behold, I Paul say to you that if you get circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to the whole law. Christ is become of no effect to you, whoever of you are justified by the law, you are fallen from grace” (Gal. 5:2-4). Harink explains: as “Martyn notes, ‘From the epistle’s beginning to its end, Paul draws contrasts not between two human alternatives, such as works and faith, but rather between acts done by human beings and acts done by God’” (Gal.1:1, 6:15). Harink adds, “God’s apocalyptic act of new creation reveals that the Galatians could not have contributed by their own actions to their rescue and rectification.”⁶⁰ In the spirit of this reading of Paul, Hauerwas criticizes Reformation tendencies to read “justification by faith” literally, as if it inserted a wedge between the human realms of action and belief. He devotes “What Could it Mean...” to an alternative reading: that the suffering of which we speak cannot be repaired by mere human works but by God alone. When the reparative Word comes, we shall serve it with body and soul, faith and works. Thus, “Quite simply, faith is our appropriate response to salvation, and it is fundamentally a moral response and transformation.”⁶¹

Conclusion

Having framed and tested several models of Hauerwas’s theopractic reasoning, I turn to a final question: does our detailed model of Lindbeck and Jenson’s postliberalism (the subject of Chapters 2 and 3) apply as well to Hauerwas’s theopractic reasoning? My concluding response is yes: while Hauerwas’s postliberalism displays distinctive marks, these are all compatible with our model of Lindbeck-Jenson’s *Semper Reformanda*.⁶² In this final section, I note how the marks of Hauerwas’s reasoning complement and also extend this model.

(A) *Semper Reformanda*: the purpose of all reformational work is to contribute to the unification of the Church, both economically in the unity of the churches and immanently in the unity of the body of Christ. Affirming this doctrine, Hauerwas attends in particular to its empirical fruit -- unity within and among the empirical churches – rather than offering conceptual or extra-scriptural claims about the character of this unity. His work also shares in the perennial work of unification, implying that perfection is not achieved within this dispensation. Some critics call him a “sectarian,” or one who believes his sect could achieve perfect unity.⁶³ Hauerwas answers them by arguing for the fallibility of theological claims: “Theological convictions inextricably involved truth-claims that are in principle open to challenge.... Indeed, I have

avoided all appeals to a Kuhnian-like position (with which Kuhn may unfairly be identified) designed to protect theological convictions from possible scientific challenge.”⁶⁴ Tied to fallibility is vagueness, and tied to vagueness is relation: Hauerwas’s Church lives in relation to contingent space-time as well as to other communities in that space-time. This kind of relationality is incompatible with a perfectionist sectarianism. For Hauerwas, finally, the perennial work of reformation is grounded in the Gospel witness to the life of Christ. Among the postliberals, his work offers a model of the reformational, reparative reading of Scripture: what we have called the marked of his “pragmatic or reparative reasoning.”⁶⁵

(B) Church doctrines are signposts of moments of radical reformation, when the Church is called to repair obstructions to its perennial work of unification. Lindbeck argues that Church doctrines answer problems that arise in the very definition of the Church as the body of Christ and of what it means for Christians to live according to Scripture’s narrative of the life of Christ. While they appear in propositional form, these propositions are, therefore, not meant to mirror reality, but to signal how the Church should protect itself against any historical tendency to obscure or obstruct that reality. For Lindbeck and Jenson, postliberalism protects the Church against modern tendencies to apply the doctrine of sola scriptura in binary ways. Hauerwas’s theopractices shares in this kind of doctrinal reform, attending, in particular, to ways of reforming the lived practices of sola scriptura and of justification by faith.⁶⁶

(C) The reformational process of doctrinal formation is an ecclesial process of re-reading the *Gospel’s witness to the life of Christ*. This re-reading uncovers historically specific guidelines for doctrinal reformation. Hauerwas shares in this reformational process when it is understood pragmatically: judged, that is, only by the way it contributes to changes in the body of church practice. As he argues in *With the Grain of the Universe*, reformational theologians are like experimental natural scientists: offering falsifiable theories to account for what they observe (in this case, in ecclesial practice) and testing their recommendations empirically (in this case, testing any proposed reforms according to their capacity to repair problematic practices).⁶⁷

(D) Postliberalism has proto-doctrinal force as a reformation of the practice of reading Scripture in the contemporary Church. This item captures Hauerwas’ reformational practice more directly than discussions of doctrine since, for him, the doctrinal rules of the Church are embedded in the narrative of Scripture, and reforms in doctrine mean reforms in how the churches read Scripture and practice what they read. In these terms, we could confirm that Hauerwas also contributes to another Reformation, sharing in

processes of revisiting and reforming the ways that Luther and Calvin reformed the churches' reading of Scripture.⁶⁸

(E) Non-supersessionism is a corollary of the postliberal reformation. Hauerwas's work confirms our thesis that postliberalism entails non-supersessionism, as illustrated in his treatment of Judaism in "What Could it Mean...."⁶⁹

Reading Hauerwas leads us to add several marks of postliberalism that, while possibly less explicit, may also be observed in Lindbeck and Jenson's writings:

(F): Where divine and human voices meet. Hauerwas, Jenson and Lindbeck all locate Scripture as the paradigmatic place of theological encounter: Scripture as witness and proclamation, Scripture as intimate relation to God and covenant, and Scripture as rule for action in the world. At the same, none of the three reads Scripture as text-alone. The text is, instead, the ineliminable face of a body that extends into sacramental intimacy and socio-political practice.⁷⁰

(G) Reasoning like Paul: apocalyptic pragmatism. All three theologians lay claim to the postliberal reading of Paul, from historiography to scriptural hermeneutic to theopractices. The dramatic characterizations of apocalypticism fit Hauerwas more than the others. Jenson comes next to mind, especially in his eschatology of time and of death. All three share, textually speaking, in Paul's recognition of Jesus Christ as the apocalypse; of the three, Lindbeck stays the closest to Thomas, perhaps, in his trust of canonical and systematic discourse as means of articulating that recognition.⁷¹

(H) *Human works will not suffice to bring Christ's reparative presence.* All three theologians seek to correct spiritualizing and thus dualistic implications of the doctrine of Justification by Faith. Obedience to biblical law brings sanctification if it is obedience to the divine will and thus an opening to the divine presence, rather than a pursuit of justification. God alone repairs, but the body of Christ cannot enter the world without embodied practice.⁷²

¹ All these terms will be defined in due course.

² As illustrated by his reply to John Cobb: "... I simply do not have the basis to know what Cobb seems to know, since I have learned to distrust the very practices that have produced the knowledge he professes. Put differently, I

think Cobb would like to be a postmodernist, but he remains caught in the discourse of modernity” (Stanley Hauerwas, *Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-century Theology and Philosophy*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1998, 25). Or his reply to Gustafson: “I suspect James Gustafson’s critique of my work gives voice to the disquiet many feel about the “newness” of my perspective. By responding to Gustafson I hope to help some readers understand better what I am about.... One cannot understand what I am about if one continues to presuppose the dominant philosophical and theological intellectual habits of the past hundred years... As I result I do not pretend that coming to understand me is easy or without risk but only that such a rethinking is required. I do not expect that those who make the effort will necessarily agree with me, but I do hope that having made the effort they will have learned something (Stanley Hauerwas, “Why the ‘Sectarian Temptation’ is a Misrepresentation: A Response to James Gustafson (1988),” in *The Hauerwas Reader*, eds. John Berkman and Michael G. Cartwright. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001, 91). See below, Notes 63, 64.

³ Since prophecy has ceased from Israel, it may be anachronistic if not also blasphemous to refer to contemporary styles of argument as “prophetic.” We have, however, not ceased to learn about God’s ways with the world, and the prophetic texts are sources of evidence of those ways.

⁴ Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1932), Vol. 5 Par. 402 Note (Future references to this edition will be only to volume and paragraph number, as here: 5.402n).

⁵ Stanley Hauerwas, “Connections Created and Contingent: Aquinas, Preller, Wittgenstein, and Hopkins,” in *Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein*, eds. Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM Press, 2004).

⁶ *Summa Theologica*, 1.1.6.2. Cited in Hauerwas, *With the Grain*, 23.

⁷ Peirce, 5.212.

⁸ “That Ye may know them by their fruit.” In Peirce’s words, pragmatism is nothing other than a logical corollary to these words of Jesus. Agreeing with James’ claim that we know what anything or any concept is by observing its effects, Peirce shows that this is equivalent to observing its effects on us (the observers) and thus on our practice or our way of living in the world. This

pragmatism builds on several key assumptions: a) We are not mere spectators of the world. For Peirce, neither psycho-biology, nor logic, nor studies of language use warrant the modern presumption that we know the world by gazing at it, as it were, from a distance. b) The more reliable evidence is that we are first and foremost actors in the world, bundles of habits, each of which links some set of sensory stimuli to some set of actions (some muscular movement). c) The world is not divided sharply between subjects and objects, knower and the known, mind and matter, the theoretical and the practical, what is active and what is passive. These binaries are unwarranted by empirical evidence. They arise as the consequence of a modern will to believe which, when granted authority, makes us suspicious of all antecedent sources of knowledge: all traditions are suspect until rendered clear in our own terms, which means until re-examined as objects of knowledge, of we which are the spectators. In this case, the modern prophecy is fulfilled, for now the sources of our knowledge appear as objects of our cognition, and the cogito emerges as that-which-cognizes. For the pragmatist, these “objects” are objects of our own intending, rather than publicly observable things or relations. They are, in other words, expressions of our responses to such things and relations, and others cannot perceive these expressions – but only their public effects or consequences. The pragmatist’s self-appointed task is to not to look past these objects of individual intention and will, but to offer a means of rendering them publicly meaningful. The means – what Peirce calls “the pragmatic maxim” – is to re-read the individual’s claims about these objects not as claims about the world, but as symptoms of some event – usually an interruptive or disruptive event – in the relation of the world to a way of knowing that world and acting in it. To read such claims is thus to re-read them as effects or consequences of certain events. This reading is thus a form of retroductive reasoning, from effect to cause: a difficult and fallible form of reasoning, but an urgent one, since if it is successful, it will enable us to re-read the otherwise private claims of individuals as sources of insight into deep dislocations in the ways we know and act in the world. The pragmatist’s task is to teach us how to generate testable hypotheses about the meanings of our

otherwise private claims, about the epistemological dislocations that may underlie these claims, and, ultimately, about how these dislocations may be repaired.

9 As noted in Chapter 2, I owe this use of the term “reparative” to Nicholas Adams, who heard my studies of pragmatism as most interesting if applied to a more general activity of “reparative reasoning.” Adams formalizes this suggestion in Nicholas Adams, “Reparative Reasoning,” in *Modern Theology* 24/3 (July 2008), pp. 447-457.

¹⁰ Retroduction is a fallibilistic form of what Kant called “transcendental reflection.”

¹¹ One lesson of Peirce’s “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” is that a certain level of retroduction does, in fact, summon what he calls “the reality of God.” This retroduction generates the broadest hypotheses we have about the order of the entire universe – “all the universes of experience” –within which we may include major paradigm shifts in science. “Musement” on the reality of God thereby underlies the logic of science. This is a central claim in Peirce’s pragmatic logic of science, but the modern philosophers who otherwise draw on Peirce’s contributions to logic tend selectively to discount this one part of his logic. In this way, they preserve the modern binaries and repress Peirce’s more medieval and scholastic-like assumption that the hypotheses that lead modern science rest on the foundation of a theological witness. In the case of Amos, there is, in other words, a prophetic voice that is at once fully human and fully divine.

12 Stanley Hauerwas, *In Good Company, The Church as Polis* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995): 19-31. I am not suggesting that these marks are definitive of Hauerwas’s work, only that they could be observed in his work.

13 The friends are William Placher and George Hunsinger, who offered their comment in an introduction to one of Frei’s essays, in Hans. W. Frei, *Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays*, eds. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993): 213-14.

14 This element of personal defense brings to mind another trait of prophetic reasoning: the prophet’s identifying personal self with prophetic mission, where the bodily state of the prophet is evidence of perception of the conditions to which God’s word responds. Hauerwas dramatizes this

materiality by speaking through a “down home” voice replete with a “Texan’s cuss words.” I

imagine that this drama is meant to counter the contemporary church’s tendency to spiritualization.

¹⁵ Hauerwas writes moreover of the inadequacy of “Rome” of itself to serve as a model of ecclesial politics:

... Catholicism is not only what it is because of the Reformation,
but Catholicism is what it is because it has also been produced in
reaction to modernity.... I am thinking of the concentration of
administrative power that seemed necessary to counter the rise of
the modern nation-state... I assume that Rome has no built-in
immunity to such processes. (*“What Could it Mean for The Church to
Be Christ’s Body?”* 27)

Hauerwas cites the following claim of Barth’s against the binaries that persist within the

Reformation as well:

... Within the organized unities of the Evangelical Churches, we
are faced with the fact of pietistic-rationalistic Modernism, with its
roots in medieval mysticism and the humanistic Renaissance....
[A]t this point, in its opposition to Roman Catholicism and to
Protestant Modernism, evangelical faith is in conflict with itself.
(Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics I/1*, trans. G.T. Thomson.
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1936, 36. Cited in *“What Could it Mean
for The Church to Be Christ’s Body?”* 27.)

¹⁶ To me, “not ours” implies that, as strictly individual reasoners, we can cognize only one of these options at a time, which is to reduce their unity to something it is not; reasoning outside our individuality, in a greater reasoning, we can share in a non-reductive, non-binary reasoning. This reasoning is not not-ours; it is fully ours and not-ours, present to what is human of us and what divine with us.

¹⁷ The individual claim appears prototypically as a cry: “and [the Israelites’] cry for help from the bondage rose up to God” (Ex. 2:23). See David Ford’s extensive account of “the cry,” in David Ford, *Christian Wisdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), *passim*.

¹⁸ Judaism includes a comparably embodied understanding of God, whose Word is embodied in Torah. My understanding of Torah is the source of my reasoning, analogically, about Hauerwas’s understanding of Christ.

¹⁹ For Hauerwas, spiritualism reduces “body” to an idea rather than to that which is directly encountered in the world. For him, “body and spirit” appear as correlatives in the world, much as Aristotle claimed. Charles Peirce liked to say that all actually existing things are vague, because we can never say of something we encounter out there in the world that we know with utter certainty that it is X or Y. We can say this only of something we ourselves have constructed or defined. Peirce also liked to say that “God” is the ultimately vague name, since it names that which we believe exceeds the limits of any of our concepts or definitions. To say something is vague, however, does not mean we can say either nothing about it or anything we want about it. An entity that really exists has really knowable properties. Vagueness is one such property. It means that the entity’s “own” character is irreducible to our binary concepts and, therefore, that our binary distinctions say more about us than they do about the entity we seek to know. It also means that there is more to know about this entity. According to Peirce and consistent with Hauerwas’s reasoning, the Matthean formula tells us how to know more: “ye shall know them by their fruit.” That is to say, the characters of the entity are not displayed overtly to us in this moment out of time, but only by the consequences (fruit) of our relation to the entity over time into the future.

Will we one day know if the entity is X or Y? That is not the right question, since it remains in binary form. The Matthean formula implies that our knowledge of the entity is relational. The question is not “what is it?” but “what is its relation to me or us in a certain point in space-time?” It is therefore appropriate to claim that “at this space-time C, it displays the character X to this observer O.” It is consistent with the vagueness of an actual entity to say of it, “it is cXo” (but not, “it is X”). That is real knowledge and a really warranted claim. Such a claim can be offered,

moreover, not only about things in the world but also about God. There is no false presumption in the claim “at this time and place in my life (my community or our tradition, and so on) God is (or names) a frightening being.” Since the claim is about the relation of that term to me at this time, I am the one who is privileged to make the claim. This does not mean that the claim is self-evident, since I may on further consideration change my mind and say something like “Ah, now I see I didn’t mean ‘frightening’ but unknown.” The perceptual evidence that leads me to say “God is now X to me” is not defined by the binary “either I know this certainly or I do not have grounds to make any claim.” It is defined, instead, by the rule of any empirical claim: I am certain that I have these feelings or sensations and I think (believe or strongly hypothesize) that they tell me this (that the dog is black, that it is raining, that the divinity is frightening). In each case, subsequent feelings or sensations can lead me to refine what I think (no, now I think the dog is really dark brown, that you are just watering the lawn, that God’s distance fills me with awe): there need not be any change in the sensory evidence per se, but only in its relation to what else I encounter in space-time. In sum, our immediate encounter with God in the world is like our encounter with anything: there are some sensations or feelings or intuitions. The difference between one category of entity and another comes in the fruit, or how our immediate sense comes into relation with who we are, where we are, and what else we encounter.

20 “The Church as God’s New Language,” in *Scriptural Authority and Narrative Interpretation*, ed. Garrett Green, (Philadelphia: Fortress Pres, 1987): 184-5. Repr. *The Hauerwas Reader*, 148-9.

21 The moments of divine-human relation, of proclamation, and of a call to action appear so closely inter-connected that I am unable to illustrate each one separately.

22 Thus, from another essay, “The church, therefore, is not some ideal of community but a particular people who, like Israel, must find the way to sustain their existence generation after generation” (“The Servant Community,” in *The Hauerwas Reader*, 383).

23 Thus, the “body” is not something that “I *have*” (“What could it mean...,” 24). Hauerwas writes, “I seek, therefore, not for the church to be a community, but rather to be a body constituted by disciplines that create the

capacity to resist the disciplines of the body associated with the modern nationstate and, particular, the economic habits that support that state” (26). This sentence associates the term “body” with what is constituted by disciplines of practice.

24 Stanley Hauerwas, “Remembering as a Moral Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust,” in *Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 61-90 (75).

²⁵ André Trocmé, *Jesus and the Nonviolent Revolution* (Scottsdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1973), 2. Cited in Hauerwas, “Remembering as a Moral Task,” n.33. Hauerwas adds, “Fortunately Trocmé’s views have found expression in John Howard Yoder’s widely read *The Politics of Jesus*” (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972).

26 It is not sufficient to attribute such self-critical diagnostics to the Deuteronomic theodicy of reward and punishment, in which Israel may seem to have attributed each of its misfortunes to some occult trespass of its own. On such a view, Deutero-Isaiah’s “Suffering Servant” marks a wholly transformed theodicy, in which the immensity of the Destruction of the Temple overwhelms Deuteronomic logic, forcing the prophet to recognize a wholly new source of Israel’s misfortune: not its own sins, but those of the nations. I am not convinced, however, that these two theodicies are so extremely different. As suggested earlier, Amos’s theodicy reasons from material effect to moral-spiritual antecedent, not to material cause, so that Israel’s suffering still belongs to the order of divine will and divine choice. While Deutero-Isaiah’s God may have more compassion for Israel and perhaps less hope for her neighbors, it is still He who puts the weight of the nations’ sins on Israel’s head; it is no law of nature. For both prophets, Israel is responsible for her actions whether or not she bears guilt for prior faults; the responsibility is a matter of divine choice. Peirce’s pragmatic reasoning follows a similar logic. While William James and some other pragmatists may have reasoned from material effects to material causes, Peirce thought a lot more was going on in an antecedent than may, on a given occasion, have appeared to dribble out in some material consequent. For him, a material effect may be symptom of an antecedent whose spiritual-mental-and-material complexity could only be imagined – or, we might say, could only be hypothesized by a wise and experienced observer and diagnostician, rather than some mechanical meter.

²⁷ William James' "The Tigers in India" illustrates a binary type of pragmatism that appears to identify pragmatic meaning with mere efficient cause. Hauerwas is right to reject this side of pragmatism; the problem does not arise in Peirce's pragmatism.

²⁸ "The Orthodox Web Site" (<http://www.orthodox.clara.net/index.html>) of the Community of St. Aidan, Clare Road, Levenshulme, Manchester, participant in the Antiochian Orthodox Deanery of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

²⁹ Since the life of Israel belongs, for the most part, to the Old Testament narrative, this dimension of Hauerwas's retroduction replays aspects of the Reformation doctrine of sola scriptura (but see below, pp. 27ff.).

³⁰ Stanley Hauerwas, "Christian Ethics in Jewish Terms: A response to David Novak," in *Christianity in Jewish Term*, 294.

³¹ Stanley Hauerwas, *Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993).

³² Stanley Hauerwas, "Christian Ethics in Jewish Terms: A response to David Novak," in *Christianity in Jewish Term*, 137. Citing Bruce Marshall, "Christ and the Culture: The Jewish People and Christian Theology," in the *Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine*, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 381.

³³ Douglas Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2003), 68.

³⁴ "The Servant Community," in *Hauerwas Reader*, 379.

³⁵ Compare Mark #1, above p. 11.

³⁶ Ron Sider, Ch 5, 218-19. He adds, in a helpful note, "The rule of Paul (1 Cor. 14) builds on the vision of the diversity of gifts attested by the church's practice of the fullness of Christ by prescribing a model for intra-ecclesial dialogue that foregrounds listening to others so as to ensure the acknowledgment of each member's gifts within the body. Both practices function on the assumption that because the Holy Spirit is present and active in the gathered community, the best way to discern the will of God is through patient attentiveness to the voice of each member" (218 n40).

³⁷ Stanley Hauerwas, “The Christian Difference...,” in *A Better Hope*, 36. Cited in Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals*, 67.

³⁸ Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals*, 67.

³⁹ Compare Marks #2-3, above, pp. 12-15.

⁴⁰ Against tendencies to divide faith vs. works or Israel’s Covenant vs. the Church, Hauerwas argues that “the body that the church becomes ... cannot be less than the body of Israel” (31). The essay as a whole is a critique of efforts to divide communal vs. bodily life; here, as throughout his work, Hauerwas “refus[es] to distinguish between theology and ethics”(21).

⁴¹ Sider, p.1, citing Yoder, *Politics of Jesus*, 105; emphasis original. Sider adds “The other dualisms include the following: the choice between the Jesus of history/Jesus of dogma, prophetic witness/institutional stability, external/internal reign of God, and the individual/social” (103-108).

⁴² “The Servant Community,” in *Hauerwas Reader*, 513.

⁴³ Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals*, 106-7. Citing John Yoder, *Politics of Jesus*, 2.

⁴⁴ Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals*, 119.

⁴⁵ Harink, *Apocalypsis and Polis: Pauline Reflections on the Theological Politics of Yoder*, 13.

⁴⁶ Compare Mark #4, above p. 15.

⁴⁷ S. Hauerwas, “Christian Schooling, or Making Students Dysfunctional,” in *Sanctify them in the Truth*, 220. Cited in Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals*, 77.

⁴⁸ Sider p. 210. Citing Alisdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), 68.

⁴⁹ C. S. Peirce, “Man’s Glassy Essence” (1892) in 6.270-271.

⁵⁰

⁵¹ “Peaceable Kingdom,” in *Hauerwas Reader*, 139.

⁵² See the discussion for “Mark #2,” above pp.12ff., also pp.16ff.

⁵³ “The Christian Life,” in *Hauerwas Reader*, 225.

⁵⁴ Sider, Ch. 5, 196

⁵⁵ “Radical Hope,” in Hauerwas Reader, 513.

⁵⁶ Compare Mark #4, above p. 15.

⁵⁷ Harink, Paul among the Postliberals, 72.

⁵⁸ Harink, Paul among the Postliberals 74-5, citing Hauerwas’s discussion of William Stringfellow in Stanley Hauerwas, *Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements With the Secular* (Durham: Duke University Press, new ed. 1995)

⁵⁹ Compare Marks #5-6, above p. 19.

⁶⁰ Harink, Paul among the Postliberals, 79

⁶¹ “Peaceable Kingdom,” in Hauerwas Reader, 139. This citation leads to the one offered earlier: “Faith for Paul is not some mystical transformation....”

⁶² Lindbeck’s focus is on scriptural hermeneutics, ecclesial history, on the practical force of Church doctrine, and on its capacity to evolve in response to each major challenge to ecclesial unity. In response to the challenge posed by modern supersessionism, he seeks reforms in the doctrine of sola scriptura that would lend non-supersessionism doctrinal status. Jenson shares in Lindbeck’s doctrinal claims and reforms, while devoting relatively more attention to Trinitarian theology and to the dramatic character of the triune life of God in the world. While devoting his primary attention to ecclesial practice rather than doctrine, Hauerwas also affirms these claims and reforms. As for general or systematic claims, he offers these in only two ways: regional criticisms of the modern church, as tending to dis-integrate the unity of the body of Christ; and a witness to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, as narrated and proclaimed in the New Testament, as defended in Church doctrine, and as encountered in what one might call the living rule of Christian theopractices.

⁶³ James Gustafson was a primary critic of this type.

Gustafson began his critique by reporting that he discovered ... some enthusiasts for my work among theologians from the Church of Scotland the Church of England, as well the Roman Catholic Church. Gustafson described this enthusiasm as a ‘seduction’ and advised that anyone tempted to follow me give some consideration to the incongruities between the ‘sectarian ecclesiology’ I represent and the ecclesiology represented by their more traditional churches.... Gustafson

develops this broadside by suggesting that my sectarianism reflects the position of certain ‘Wittgensteinian fideists,’ such as Paul Homer and Gorge Lindbeck, who allegedly hold that the language of science and the language of religion are totally incommensurable.... In opposition to this view, Gustafson argues that insofar as religion and science are rational activities, it must be possible in principle to subject theological claims to correction and revision in terms of what we have learned from the social and physical sciences. . . . [Gustafson holds, moreover] that my sectarian tendencies are based on the theological assumption “that God is known only in and through history, and particularly through the history of the Biblical people culminating in the events of Christ and their effects. In Christian sectarian form God becomes a Christian God for Christian people: to put it more pejoratively, God is assumed to be the tribal God of a minority of the world’s population...” (Hauerwas, “Why the ‘Sectarian Temptation’ is a Misrepresentation, 91-5, citing James Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology the Church, and the University,” *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society* 40 (1985), 83-94: p. 93.)

⁶⁴ Hauerwas, “Why the ‘Sectarian Temptation’ is a Misrepresentation, 98. Hauerwas continues, “certainly I do not believe, nor did Wittgenstein, that religious convictions are or should be treated as an internally consistent language game that is self-validating” (99). See also Note 2 above. 98.

⁶⁵ See Mark 1 of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning, above p. 7.

⁶⁶ As illustrated in the 5th Mark of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning, above p. 12.

⁶⁷ As illustrated above, p. 4, Hauerwas, like the pragmatists, criticizes modern natural philosophy not for its empiricism but for its rationalism and thus for its failure to attend to the empirical world. See the 4th Mark of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning, above p.8.

⁶⁸ As illustrated in the 5th Mark of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning, pp. 12-14, and in Mark #3c of his apocalyptic pragmatism, above pp. 23-26.

⁶⁹ As illustrated in the 5th Mark of Hauerwas’s reparative reasoning, above pp. 12-20.

⁷⁰ By way of illustration: on Lindbeck, see his critique of mediating theology and thus his claim that “God alone” repairs, Ch. 2 pp. 9, 16; on Jenson’s scriptural pragmatism, see Ch. 3, pp. 6ff; on his critique of mediating or

conceptual theology, see Ch. 3, pp. 26-30; on Hauerwas's account of divine-human intimacy, see above, the 4th Mark of theopractices p.10; his overall apocalyptic pragmatism, pp. 20ff.

⁷¹ By way of illustration: on Lindbeck's attention to doctrinal reform, see Ch. 2, pp. 2ff; on Jenson's Pauline account of the availability of the resurrected body of Christ, see Ch. 3, pp. 10f and pp. 33-35; on Hauerwas's overall apocalyptic pragmatism, see above, pp. 20ff.

⁷² By way of illustration: on Lindbeck, see his critique of intellectualization Ch. 2, p. 29; on Jenson, see his argument that the Triune God alone redeems, Ch. 3, pp.7ff, and on the embodied character of the divine life among us, Ch. 3, pp. 32-34; on Hauerwas, see his apocalyptic pragmatism, above pp. 20ff.