The Dark Side of Emotion Regulation: Historical Defensiveness as an Obstacle in Reconciliation

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In recent years, the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2015) has attracted increasing attention of researchers studying group processes and intergroup relations (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016; Halperin, Russell, Tresniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011). Recent applications of this model to the study of group-based emotions, such as collective guilt, shame, anger, and hope, tend to integrate the main theoretical assumptions of the process model of emotion regulation with intergroup emotion (Smith, 1993), social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and self-categorization theories (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). Although the main aim of the process model of group-based emotion regulation was to better explain the dynamics and antecedents of collective moral emotion, most empirical research stemming from this approach focuses on practical interventions, such as conflict resolution (Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014), attitude change (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013), and peace processes (Halperin et al., 2011).

Čehajić-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin (this issue) apply the process model of group-based emotion regulation to the context of postconflict reconciliation. They present evidence that people can successfully downregulate their negative intergroup emotions, such as hatred or anger, and upregulate the positive intergroup emotions, such as guilt or empathy. As the approach proposed by Čehajić-Clancy and colleagues is based on a solid ground of empirical research analyzing effective interventions in several postconflict regions, it could be used in planning efficient reconciliatory policies that would address the psychological needs of both victims and perpetrators. At the same time, it relies on the assumption that positive intergroup emotions (peace-promoting) are indeed being experienced as positive by individuals—and that the negative intergroup emotions (peace-deteriorating) are experienced as negative by individual people. This assumption seems to contradict the basic tenet of intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). According to this theory, when social identity is salient, individuals experience emotions on behalf of the ingroup. The valence of experienced emotions is dependent on the group interest—a group-directed threat evokes positive emotions, whereas positive group status evokes negative emotions in individuals. As long as the social identity is salient, the emotion regulation process will be guided by group-level motives rather than by systemic motives (peaceful relations between groups within a social system).

The reconciliatory process of emotion regulation proposed by Čehajić-Clancy et al. (this issue) suggests that the emotion regulation processes can be guided by the systemic motives (more peaceful intergroup relations) instead of group-level motives (positive intergroup distinctiveness) or individual motives (positive self-esteem). On the other hand, it is known that successful emotion regulation processes occurring at both individual (Gross, 2015) and collective levels of self-definition (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016) can have detrimental effects for the reconciliation process occurring at a systemic level.

Emotion Regulation For and Against Reconciliation

One example of such contradicting regulatory processes at individual, collective, and universal/systemic levels can be observed in the case of collective guilt. As Čehajić-Clancy et al. (this issue) correctly corroborate, guilt is a negative and unpleasant emotion that has some positive intergroup outcomes, such as the willingness to compensate victims (Dooijse, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). At the same time, the emotion of guilt is threatening to positive intergroup distinctiveness, as it portrays the ingroup in a negative manner (Dooijse et al., 1998). This suggests that people would intentionally and automatically downregulate this emotion on the level of their individual identity (as it is unpleasant and aversive), that they would downregulate this emotion on the level of their social identity (as it is threatening to their group status), and that they could upregulate this emotion on the level of their universal identities (as it improves intergroup relations). In fact, all these levels of self-definition could lead to separate emotion regulation processes.

The universal-level processes of upregulating guilt were comprehensively described in the review of interventions by Čehajić-Clancy et al. (this issue). On the other hand, universal-level identities (e.g., identification with all humanity) are relatively rare compared to national or regional identities (McFaddan, Webb, & Brown, 2012). In the study of national-level identifications, there is considerable agreement that people who strongly identify with their nations try to downregulate their collective guilt (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Recent research by Sharvit, Brambilla, Babush, and Colucci (2015) confirmed that the downregulation of guilt has the deliberate character of motivated reasoning. People have difficulties with such regulation under
cognitive load—and even people who highly identify with the group experience guilt when their cognitive capacities are constrained. The effects of such well-functioning regulatory processes are well known. People generally do not experience the aversive moral emotion of guilt. In most published studies on the topic, only a very small proportion of participants experienced self-critical emotions such as guilt or shame; most participants did not feel collective responsibility and did not support reparation (for a review, see Leach, Bou Zeineddine, & Cehajić-Clancy, 2013).

The main aim of this article is to explain potential mechanisms of historical defensiveness that constitute the downregulation process of collective guilt, shame, regret, and responsibility. Such processes, if well functioning, are obviously detrimental to any postconflict reconciliation efforts. Based on this model I suggest that successful reconciliation strategies not only should be based on emotion regulation (as suggested by Cehajić-Clancy et al., this issue), but it should also address identity, as a key antecedent of these emotions. Reconciliation should start from the redefinition of social identities—into more inclusive or more local levels of self-definition.

Historical Defensiveness as an Identity-Motivated Process

After the end of a violent conflict there is a heightened need to understand and explain the tragic intergroup past, and to restore threatened identities among victims and perpetrators. After such conflict, the main effort of the victimized group is to restore their sense of agency and control, whereas the main motivation of the perpetrator group is to restore their moral-communal dimension of identity (Nadler & Snably, 2015; Snably & Nadler, 2008). This creates a situation in which the victim group is motivated to remember the historical crimes, whereas the perpetrator group is motivated to forget, deny, or cognitively modify the meaning of the past crimes. Such divergent motives pose a threat to intergroup encounters between the descendants of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. If the descendants of these groups spontaneously touch on historical topics, their contact does not lead to the improvement of mutual attitudes (Bilewicz, 2007). To understand such failures of reconciliation, one has to identify the defensive processes of historical perpetrators and their descendants.

The defensiveness of perpetrators and their unwillingness to take responsibility for historical crimes (Leach, Bou Zeineddine, & Cehajić-Clancy, 2013) can be explained on the basis of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to this theory, people are motivated to attain a positive social identity by favorable intergroup differentiation, whereby their ingroup is viewed in a positive manner. Information about negative historical ingroup behavior poses a threat to social identity, particularly among highly identifying group members, and this ultimately leads to negative emotions that could be minimized by various forms of collective self-affirmation (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). This process motivates group members to rewrite and reinterpret the negative group history.

The lay historian model proposed by Klein (2013) claims that the memory of past events is psychologically shaped and distorted by selective remembering (memory processes), explaining (causal attribution), and communication (representation). Social identity theory suggests that these processes could be influenced by the desire to achieve a positive image of the ingroup. When perpetrators are confronted with the information about their past immoral behavior, they would employ a particular structure of explanation (ethnocentric attribution), communication (censorship), and remembering (motivated forgetting) to follow a historical narrative that relieves them from negative affect. The summary of these strategies is presented in Figure 1, based on the research findings that are presented in the following sections.

The model just presented suggests a paradox of successful emotion regulation. The process of downregulating negative emotion by individuals can in fact be detrimental for intergroup relations. People who are efficient in these strategies are able to effectively deny their collective responsibility and reject any attempts at reconciliation.

Situation Selection: Avoiding Contact and Detaching from the Past

Situation selection is an antecedent-focused strategy of emotion regulation in which people avoid situations that give rise to
undesirable emotions. When faced with negative historical knowledge, people employ this strategy on three levels. First is the avoidance of the source of information. Contact with historical victims can give rise to unpleasant emotions, as it reminds one of the historical misdeeds of ingroup members. Research performed during Polish–Jewish encounter programs (Bilewicz, 2007) showed that when Poles focused on the historical information during such encounters, their level of intergroup anxiety was increased. Further qualitative analyses showed that Poles expected that the descendants of Jewish victims might remind them about their group’s historical behavior (Bilewicz, Stefaniak, & Witkowska, 2014). People high in intergroup anxiety anticipate negative consequences of intergroup contact and avoid any form of such contact (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). We found this to be even more evident in studies focused on group-level moral emotions of collective guilt and regret in Germany and Poland (Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2013). Those Germans who experienced guilt after visiting the museum in a former Gestapo headquarters in Cologne anticipated more negative emotions when encountering a Jewish person. Guilt did not lead to increased contact intentions in German or in Polish studies on the topic. Studies on antisemitism performed on nationwide samples in Poland show that historical defensiveness (e.g., the unwillingness to talk about the historical crimes against Jews) is correlated with higher social distance: the avoidance of Jews as possible neighbors, partners, and colleagues (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kołta, & Wójcik, 2013).

In addition to avoiding historical victims as the bearers of negative knowledge about the ingroup, people can also selectively choose those historical narratives that do not threaten their positive identities. When people are confronted with negative history, they are more willing to focus their attention of moral ingroup members and overestimate the number of such individuals (Bilewicz et al., 2014). They can also subjectively distance themselves from the negative history. When Germans read about atrocities perpetrated by their compatriots, they perceive these events as more subjectively remote in time than if they read a narrative about the same period but without the threatening content (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010). Such temporal distancing was shown to reduce the emotion of collective guilt. The perception of crime as temporally remote also allows people to downregulate ingroup-directed anger and decrease willingness to compensate victims (Figueiredo, Valentim, & Doosje, 2015). The strategic side of this process is clearly visible in historical closure—a perception of history as a closed chapter—that relieves descendants of perpetrators from group-based emotions such as guilt or shame (Imhoff, 2010; Imhoff, Wohl, & Erb, 2013).

**Situation Modification: Censorship and Silencing**

When dealing with negative historical knowledge, people also take action that alters their uncomfortable situation in order to reduce the negative emotions stemming from such knowledge. One of the strategies that allows for the silencing of the source of information is historical censorship (Klar & Bilewicz, 2016). The Soviet censorship of the 1940 Katyn massacre of Polish officers, as well as Turkish censorship regarding the 1915 genocide of Armenians, are some well-known examples of states punishing those who reveal the negative history of their nation (De Baets, 2002).

When confronted with negative history of their ingroup, people might actively call for censorship, derogate the person who reveals such history, or deny the credibility of the source. All of these strategies stem from narcissistic identification: a high but unstable national self-esteem (Cichocka, Marchlewiska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2015; Klar & Bilewicz, 2016). Jan Tomasz Gross, a prominent scholar who revealed unknown facts from Polish history (the massacre of Jews in Jedwabne, postwar pogroms and looting of Jewish property by Poles) in his three widely discussed books (Gross, 2001, 2006, 2012) faced a whole range of such reactions: His opponents questioned his historical competence, they denied the facts described in his books, and later one of the leading parties in Poland called for imposing the “Gross law” in order to prevent such historical facts from being revealed (Witkowska & Bilewicz, 2014).

Although history cannot be modified, the experiences of totalitarian regimes (as depicted by George Orwell (1949) in 1984) suggest that contemporaries can alter the transmission of historical content. Therefore, historical knowledge can become a subject of situation modification strategy, serving the needs of national identity. When this process becomes highly internalized, it leads to self-censorship actions in which people and institutions inhibit the dissemination of negative knowledge about their national group. This phenomenon is visible particularly in the suppression of complex collective memories of conflict situations (Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).

The intentional silencing of the negative history is particularly visible when social identities are salient. For example, Americans with highly salient national identities were more inclined to silence any mentions of the mistreatment of Native Americans during Thanksgiving commemorations (Kurtiš, Adams, & Yellow Bird, 2010).

**Attentional Deployment: Victimhood Competition, Conspiracy Beliefs, and Autochthony Beliefs**

When people are confronted with information about their groups’ negative historical behavior, they almost automatically redirect attention to positive historical facts or to those episodes in which their group was victimized (Bilewicz et al., 2014). When focusing on ingroup victimization, people can easily deny the fact that they have caused any harm to other groups—due to the moral typecasting process (Gray & Wegner, 2009). By perceiving the ingroup as having been victimized, people deny other groups’ victimhood, be it their direct enemies (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012) or other unrelated groups that might be competing over victim status (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, 2013; Vollhardt, Bilewicz, & Olechowski, 2015). This obviously allows people to maintain the sense of ingroup innocence and to downregulate potential negative emotions.

Focusing attention on those historical episodes in which the ingroup was victimized also provides a framework for understanding contemporary reality. Our recent research performed in Greece and Poland (Witkowska, Bilewicz, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, & Klein, 2016) shows that a focus on
historical victimhood can make people more prone to endorse conspiracy theories. Particularly among people highly committed to their national group, a focus on historical victimhood was related to the perception of others as conspiring against them. People who endorse conspiracy theories can deny any information portraying the ingroup in a negative light, and present such information as unreliable accusations by some unknown external forces. The belief in conspiracy theories motivates general hostility toward all outgroup members and presents a severe obstacle to reconciliation while it allows for the maintenance of a positive image of the ingroup. It also creates an illusory sense of control over the political environment (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).

One strategy of attentional deployment is to negate the historical presence of outgroup members. Studies performed in cities that changed their ethnic composition in the past show that current inhabitants have a tendency to underestimate the number of outgroup members living in such places in the past (Lewicka, 2008; Wójcik, Bilewicz, & Lewicka, 2010). Therefore, people have a tendency to perceive their own group as autochthonous in a given area and outgroup members as illegitimate immigrants (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013), which can further downregulate any negative emotions caused by crimes committed by the “natives” on the “newcomers.”

Cognitive Change: Attributional Biases, Dehumanization, and Recategorization

Most of the emotional regulation strategies used in historical defensiveness could be characterized as strategies of cognitive change: the modification of one’s appraisal of a situation to minimize its negative emotional impact. When learning about negative historical facts, people explain such facts in a way that protects their positive group image. Crimes committed by the ingroup are explained by external (situational) causes, whereas crimes committed by the outgroup are explained by internal (dispositional) causes, following an ethnocentric pattern of attribution (Hewstone, 1989; Taylor & Jaggard, 1974). Studies on historical explanation showed that Jewish visitors of the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam attributed the Holocaust more often to dispositional traits of German perpetrators than German visitors did (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). Poles, when asked to explain Polish-Ukrainian ethnic cleansing in Pawlówkoma area, used more dispositional attributions when explaining outgroup crimes than when explaining similar ingroup crimes in that region (Bilewicz & Dudek, 2010). In a systematic study of such historical attributions, we found that biases in the explanation of negative ingroup behavior are motivated by strong national identification and cognitive rigidity (Bilewicz, Witkowska, Stefanias, & Imhoff, 2016). They allow people to not feel responsible for the historical atrocities committed by fellow ingroup members.

Negative emotions raised by knowledge of historical misdeeds can be also downregulated by changing the representation of the victims. The members of groups victimized by the ingroup are perceived as being less human (i.e., experiencing less uniquely human emotions) than members of groups victimized by other, unrelated groups (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Polish participants, when reminded about postwar pogroms committed by Poles on their Jewish compatriots, attributed less emotions to the victims than participants who did not read such narratives (Kofta & Slawuta, 2013). Furthermore, such emotional dehumanization decreases empathy felt toward the victims of crime perpetrated by fellow ingroup members (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009) and limits collective guilt (Kofta & Slawuta, 2013). Another form of cognitive change refers to the perception of morality. Depending on political views and contexts, people can focus on different understandings of morality: They may consider the fundamental moral foundation to be not harm and fairness, but loyalty, authority, or purity (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). When people are confronted with information about ingroup-committed harm, they immediately change their understanding of morality. They indeed focus more on loyalty and authority as key moral foundations, instead of harm and fairness (Leidner & Castano, 2012). This shift is an effective strategy of moral disengagement on a collective level.

Response Modulation: Switching Moral Emotions

Emotional responses to negative historical events can be both constrained and modulated. The expression of intergroup emotion can obviously have a strategic character. Public apologies can be supported by perpetrator groups as a way of shifting obligation onto the victimized group (Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). The expression of emotions can be strategic as well. The same negative event can lead to the emotional expression of shame, guilt, or regret. The emotion of shame can communicate a perceived violation of moral values and self-image (moral shame), but it can also be an expression of a perceived threat to social image (image shame; Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & Teroni, 2014; Gausel & Leach, 2011). In this second case, shame would be linked to distancing from outgroup members and other negative consequences for intergroup relations (Rees, Allpress, & Brown, 2013). Guilt, another emotion stemming from the sense of moral responsibility, was assumed to have predominantly positive consequences for intergroup relations (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). A more detailed analysis of the consequences of this emotion suggests that guilt is predominantly related to material compensation and reparation intentions. At the same time, guilt is strongly aversive, does not improve general attitudes or intentions to engage in intergroup contact (Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012). This emotion clearly addresses crucial needs of the victims who are striving for resources (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), but it does not restore a positive approach of perpetrators toward them. On the contrary, the emotion of collective regret is related to contact intentions but has no effect on reparations to the victims (Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012). Although this emotion does not address the victims’ needs, it leads to more intense and prolonged contact and to the possibility of further intergroup communication of the needs of both sides.

The choice of specific emotion expression could be related to the specific intentions of perpetrators, as well as to strategic motives in perpetrator–victim relations. Although research on reconciliation suggests that victims expect reparations rather than moral emotions (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), studies on
apologies show that victims await acknowledgment of the crimes and emotional expression, instead of reparations or compensation (Kirchhoff & Češajić-Clancy, 2014; Kirchhoff, Wagner, & Strack, 2012). This is why different expressions of emotions in apologies (e.g., repairation-related guilt, image-restoring shame vs. contact-oriented regret) could be strategically chosen in order to address self-image and social-image concerns, as well as relational needs. The apology—a public expression of collective moral emotion—can also be silenced by fellow ingroup members or self-censored for the sake of national pride.

**Beyond Historical Negation: Shifting Identities**

The emotion regulation process can play a significantly detrimental role in intergroup relations after wars, conflict, and genocide. It can pose a serious obstacle to reconciliation. Češajić-Clancy and colleagues suggest reconciliation strategies that upregulate specific collective emotions. Such emotions, appearing on the group level of people’s self-definition, are dependent on social identities. Therefore changing expression and regulation of specific emotions might be an ineffective surface-level operation, as it does not interfere with the social identities on which these emotions are based. Social identity is not only a source of collective moral emotions but also a source of historical defensiveness, a system that often encourages the downregulation of aversive emotions, such as guilt, shame, or remorse.

In the case of most of the strategies of historical defensiveness just mentioned, social identity plays an essential role. People who strongly identify with their group express collective moral emotions to a lesser extent (Klein, Licata, & Pierucci, 2011; Wohl, Branscombe & Klar, 2006), show more ethnocentric biases when explaining negative historical actions (Bilewicz et al., 2016; Doosje & Branscombe, 2003), and show greater support for silencing and denial (Kurtiš et al., 2010), as well as many other historical defensive strategies in regulating their negative emotions. Particularly, the defensive forms of national identification, such as ingroup glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) or collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009), are known to play a negative role in reconciliation, as they directly lead to the downregulation of guilt, as well as to the denial of information that is threatening to the group’s image.

Based on that, I would like to propose an alternative strategy of reconciliation that is based not on emotion regulation but on shifting the levels of social identity (self-categorization). As national/ethnic level self-definition often result in historical defensiveness, a successful strategy could be based on shifting the level of self-categorization to higher (e.g., universal, human, continental) or just different (e.g., regional, urban) levels of identification than the national or ethnic one.

Češajić-Clancy and colleagues mention recategorization as a strategy to enhance empathy. Based on existing research, one could expect recategorization to have much more far-reaching consequences. When focusing on the common ingroup category, the processes of ingroup favoritism are redirected toward the new, more inclusive ingroup (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). This means that historical defensiveness resulting from national identities is not needed anymore. The entire process of downregulating negative emotions stemming from strong identification becomes unnecessary. There is considerable evidence for this effect. A study performed after the Kosovo war showed that stronger identification with a superordinate category (“inhabitants of Kosovo territory”) reduced victimhood competition, one of the essential strategies of historical defensiveness, among Albanians who compete over victim status with Serbs (Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012). Superordinate categories lead to greater acknowledgment of other victimized groups (Vollhardt, 2013) and reduce dehumanization of the victims (Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012; Kołta & Slawuta, 2013). After recategorization Poles were more willing to acknowledge the historical crimes committed by their compatriots by overcoming the defensive processes, such as dehumanization and guilt denial (Kołta & Slawuta, 2013). Among victimized groups, superordinate categories can lead to greater forgiveness and decreased expectations of guilt (Hamer, Penczek, & Bilewicz, 2016; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

National-level social identity can be replaced not only with the broader supranational identities but also with the local, regional ones. When focusing on local identities (e.g., New Yorkers, Varsoviants), people are more willing to incorporate victimized outgroups into their local identity. Thus, urban or local categories could cross-cut national or ethnic distinctions (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). The analysis of an intervention performed in 27 ethnically homogeneous small towns in Poland found that exposure to local Jewish history changed people’s identity into a more inclusive one and improved attitudes toward Jews among ethnic Poles living in these towns (Stefaniak & Bilewicz, 2016). Also, Varsoviants’ interest in local history was associated with more inclusive representations of Warsaw history and less historical ethnic bias (Wójcik, Bilewicz, & Lewicka, 2010). The inclusion of outgroup victims and minorities in local social identities seems to override national-level historical defensiveness and to ultimately improve current intergroup relations.

**Summary**

When national-level identities are salient, people interpret their history in a biased way that reinforces the conflict instead of promoting reconciliation. Emotion regulation strategies are generally inclined to downregulate guilt, shame, regret, and other reconciliatory moral emotions, as any acknowledgment of responsibility would be threatening to social identity needs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and because the conflict itself is the ultimate attractor of victim–perpetrator dynamics (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bai-Wrszdinska, 2007). The basic assumption underlying intergroup emotion regulation processes is the existence of social identity: the collective level self-definition of individuals (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016). In fact, social identities are inevitable—they are at the core of any social thinking among humans. Thus, social identity is also a prerequisite for the experience of any collective moral emotion, such as guilt, shame, regret, remorse, hope, or ingroup-directed anger. In order to feel emotional about the group, one has to identify with it. On the other hand, the mere existence of social identity processes downregulates these emotions, because the
acknowledgment of ingroup misdeeds poses a threat to positive self-image. Acknowledging this paradox of social identification, one could propose another framework of thinking about reconciliation: one based on social identities instead of emotion regulation. Reconciliation is possible when people have several levels of self-categorization accessible (McCarty, 1999): local, national, and supranational ones. In most cases, however, the national identities are more salient than more universal ones (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). Making the local and supranational categories salient when processing historical information could be a more effective way to reconcile historical enemies than focusing on specific emotions that result from national-level identities. Identity-related interventions can provide a long-lasting change, as they are the true antecedent-focused form of emotion regulation on a collective level.

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